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Ownership and Transfer of Interests
in Life Insurance Policies
By LEwis D. AspER*
AT the end of 1967, life insurance in force in the United States
totaled $1079.8 billion.1 This figure, of course, represents the total,
substantially unmatured obligation of insurance companies; but this
obligation was backed by $177.4 billion of assets held by the com-
panies.2 Life insurance is probably the single most important form
of savings for many if not most citizens. The investment in life
insurance, in common with most other forms of savings, is transfer-
able. It can be withdrawn, hypothecated, sold or given away. While
investment in life insurance continues to grow at an accelerated rate,
the legal principles governing ownership and transfer of this enor-
mous pool of assets remain uncertain, disorderly, even misleading.
As the editors of a leading insurance casebook have pointed out, the
methods of disposition of this singularly important form of wealth
have developed without the benefit of a background of feudal land
law and with little assistance from recording acts or other legislation
addressed directly to questions of transfer.3 The system, such as it
is, has evolved largely from a judicial interpretation of those terms
inserted in policies by insurers for their own protection.
4
Historical Foundation
Life insurance has been a significant economic fact in the United
States only since the middle of the nineteenth century.5 From the
beginning the state has recognized that it has an interest in private
contracts which ensure that families of deceased breadwinners will
not become public charges.
Exemption Statutes
As early as 1840, New York enacted its Verplanck Act 6 authorizing
*Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1 INsTITUTE OF LI.E INSURANcE, IarE INsuRANcE FACT BOOK 19 (1968).
2 Id. at 63.
3 E. PATTERSON & W. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF IN-
suRANcE 170 (4th ed. 1961).
4 Id.
5 J. MACLEAN, L= INSURANCE 575-89 (9th ed. 1962).
6 N.Y. Laws 1840, ch. 80, at 59.
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any married woman to insure the life of her husband. The Act pro-
vided that if the wife survived her husband the money payable under
such a contract was to be payable to her for her own use, free of the
claims of her husband's representatives or creditors. Massachusetts
followed in 18447 with a statute providing that any policy procured
for the benefit of a married woman by any person on any life was
to be for her separate use and benefit, free of any claims of her hus-
band, his representatives or his creditors. These statutes were widely
copied and at present are found in the codes of all the states in the
union.8 The present significance of such statutes lies in their exemp-
tion features. The early statutes were also designed to foreclose any
questions about a wife's insurable interest in her husband's life and
to remove for this special purpose the incapacity of a married woman
to contract.9 Their influence on the development of insurance law
principles extended beyond what early legislators anticipated. 0
To courts and legislatures of the middle nineteenth century the
life insurance contract must have been something of a puzzle. Law-
rence v. Fox' was still several years away when the New York and
Massachusetts statutes were enacted. As noted, the Massachusetts act
was from the beginning directed to any policy procured by anyone
for the benefit of a married woman, and the New York statute was
amended in 1858 to "clarify" the intention that the stated exemp-
tions were to apply even though the premiums were paid out of the
husband's assets.12 In effect, a class of third party beneficiaries (and
donee beneficiaries at that) was created by statute some years before
the courts had squarely faced the phenomenon of a contract promise
for the benefit of a stranger.
Professor Vance was persuaded that the early statutes exercised
an unusual influence on the development of insurance law.'3 The
early life insurance contract was a relatively simple document pro-
viding that, conditioned on payment of premiums, the insurer prom-
ised to pay a sum of money to a designated beneficiary upon the death
of the insured. Absent anything else, there was no reason to believe
7 Mass. Laws 1844, ch. 82, at 282.
8 See Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United
States, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583, 588-604 (1957) (comprehensive review of modem
exemption statutes).
9 Id. at 589.
10 See, e.g., Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Weitz, 99 Mass. 157 (1868);
Gould v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154 (1868). See generally Vance, The Beneficiary's
Interest In A Life Insurance Policy, 31 YALE L.J. 343, 349-54 (1922).
11 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
12 Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United
States, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 583, 589 (1957).
13 See Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest In A Life Insurance Policy, 31
YALE L.J. 343, 349-54 (1922).
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that the contracting parties, insurer and insured, were powerless to
rescind or modify the contract by mutual agreement at a later date.
However, after the 1840's, courts, called upon to decide what rights
accrued to a beneficiary under these contracts, looked to the exemp-
tion statutes and found in these enactments the creation of an "equity"
or "equitable right" in the beneficiary.14 Within a remarkably short
time the "equity" blossomed into the "vested interest" of a donee
beneficiary of a life policy.15 Under this judicially conceived form of
spontaneous combustion, the policy and its proceeds became the prop-
erty of the beneficiary from the moment it was issued.16 There-
after no power remained in the person procuring the policy to transfer
any interest to another person or to appropriate any interest to him-
self.'7 Once articulated, this theory was grasped enthusiastically by
courts which apparently shared the concern of the early legislatures
for widows and children.'8 The "vested interest" of the beneficiary
of a life policy became the law of every state but one.' 9
Nonforfeiture Statutes
Meanwhile other developments were taking account of the invest-
ment character of this method of saving by which, in the usual case, a
breadwinner creates a fund readily accessible to his dependents
when he dies (with the additional risk protection advantage of making
that fund available even if his death is premature). The most con-
venient and practical means of creating such a fund is through the
use of the "level premium,"20 and the great majority of life policies
soon employed this premium payment form.2' One effect of the level
14 See Gould v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154 (1868) (beneficiary termed "cestui
que trust" of insurance proceeds).
15 See Lemon v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 34 Conn. 294 (1871); Fowler
v. Butterly, 78 N.Y. 68 (1878).
16 See Ricker v. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co., 27 Minn. 193, 6 N.W. 771
(1880).
17 See Fowler v. Butterly, 78 N.Y. 68 (1879).
18 Professor Vance attributed extraordinary influence to one early text-
writer. The first edition of Bliss on Life Insurance published in 1872 stated
the "vested interest" theory as an established rule, even though there was
little, if any, support for it in the decisions. G. BLISS, THE LAW OF LIFE IN-
SURANCE § 318 (1st ed. 1872). Within a few years it "soared from the pages
of his text book, cast off its quotation marks" and took its place in opinions
as a statement of a settled rule. Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest In A Life
Insurance Policy, 31 YALE L.J. 343, 347-48 (1922).
19 4 G. COUCE, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 27:56 (2d ed. R. Ander-
son 1960). Wisconsin is the exception. Clark v. Durand, 12 Wis. 223 (1860);
see Ellison v. Straw, 116 Wis. 207, 92 N.W. 1094 (1902).
20 This is the term used to describe the familiar arrangement under which
the premium remains the same from year to year.
21 See W. VANCE, HANDBoox OF THE LAW OF LIF INSURANCE 70 (3d ed.
1951) [hereinafter cited as VANCE].
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premium is that in the earlier years of the policy the annual premium
payment exceeds the annual "cost" of covering the risk. Thus, if
policy lapse is to mean simply termination of the obligation of the
insurer, the companies in many instances will enjoy a substantial
windfall. 22 Indeed, in the early years of the industry when policies
contained no provisions for surrender value, cash or otherwise, some
companies were able to pay their entire operating expenses out of
"profits" made from lapsed policies.23  To rectify this inequity, the
state legislatures once more were called upon, and what are usually
referred to as nonforfeiture acts were enacted. The early statutes
were comparatively modest, requiring insurers, upon default in pre-
mium payment, to grant extended term insurance calculated on the
basis of a specified percentage of the "net value" of the policy at
time of lapse.24 The modern nonforfeiture statute, which commonly
requires insurers to offer a choice of surrender options including a
minimum cash value, was first introduced into the New York insur-
ance law in 190625 and has been widely copied in other states.2
Effect of the Early Statutes
These two classes of statutes, exemption and nonforfeiture, were
among the earliest expressions of legislative concern with life insur-
ance. Addressed directly to the interests of the parties to the con-
22 This is not the place for detailed discussion of actuarial calculations
that go into determining proper level premiums. Obviously, the premium
paid in the earlier years of the life of an insured when the risk is smaller
includes an amount in excess of the actual "cost" of covering the risk. The
excess builds up a reserve needed for the later years when the level premium
is less than the cost of covering the risk. The windfall to the insurer results
when a lapse of the policy terminates the insurer's obligation to pay the
policy value upon the death of the insured-and the windfall is equal to
the amount of the reserve which has been accumulated by the insurer prior
to termination. Relatively simple explanations are found in the text books.
See, e.g., J. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 13-19 (9th ed. 1962); VANCE, supra note
21, at 70-75.
23 J. MACLEAN, LIFE INSURACCE 173 (9th ed. 1962); VANcE, supra note
21, at 609-10.
24 See VANCE, supra note 21, at 609.
25 The 1905 Armstrong investigation by a committee appointed by the
New York Legislature is an important event in the history of life insurance
and its regulation in the United States. The labors of the committee and its
examining counsel, Charles Evans Hughes, prompted extensive legislation in
New York relative to government regulation, insurance company investments
and the cost of life insurance.
26 The New York enactments were tremendously influential in other
states. See J. MAcLEAN, LIFE INSURANCE 590-96 (9th ed. 1962); VANcE, supra
note 21, at 609-10.
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tract, they indicated two distinct but imperfectly defined objectives:
Protection of the beneficiary's interest in death benefits and protection
of the investment interest of the investor. The judicial addition of
the vested interest notion lent a faintly ambivalent quality to the
whole picture, since under this theory the beneficiary owns both sets
of interests from the moment the contract is made.27 Rigorous ad-
herence to the vested interest theory might have made life insurance
a far less adaptable form of investment than it now is, but a simple
drafting change in insurance contracts neutralized this potential for
mischief. Policy forms were recast to include as a standard provision
reservation of a right in the insured to change the beneficiary. In a
majority of jurisdictions this change in contract terms converted the
beneficiary's vested interest into a "mere expectancy" and left the
ownership and the asset value of the policy in the insured-"in-
vestor."28  Even those jurisdictions that continued to recognize a
technical vested interest in the beneficiary in the face of this policy
reservation conceded the power of the insured to deal with the policy
as an owner, but required closer attention to formalities when in-
terests under the policy were to be altered.
29
In a sense, the legal principles governing ownership and transfer
of interests in life insurance are the product of an effort to accom-
modate the two broad policy objectives-protection of the beneficiary's
interest in death benefits and protection of the investment interest of
the investor. The law's solicitude for widows or other natural ob-
jects of the insured's bounty is regularly reflected in court decisions
as well as in exemption statutes. 0 Yet at the same time, too many
restrictions on the power of an insured to deal with his insurance
investment can diminish the value of that investment.31 The versa-
27 A necessary consequence of the vested interest principle is owner-
ship of the policy in the beneficiary. Finney v. Hinkle, 106 Ohio App. 89,
153 N.E.2d 699 (1958); VANcE, supra note 21, at 665.
28 E.g., Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 174-75, 157 P.2d 841, 842 (1945);
Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 579, 583, 103 P.2d 963, 965 (1940);
see Davis v. Modern Indus. Bank, 279 N.Y. 405, 415, 18 N.E.2d 639, 643 (1939).
See generally VANcE, supra note 21, at 675-78.
29 This position is sometimes referred to as the "New Jersey Rule" as
well as the "vested interest" rule. Under this approach the interests of a
beneficiary can be divested only by a formal change of beneficiary. An as-
signment is a transfer only of such rights as the insured has while he is alive
and a right to take death benefits only if the insured survives the beneficiary.
Sullivan v. Maroney, 76 N.J. Eq. 104, 73 A. 842 (Ch. 1909), aftf'd, 77 N.J. Eq.
565, 78 A. 150 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910). But see Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Connelly, 188 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1951) (rule does not apply if policy reserves
right of assignment to insured).
30 See, e.g., Katzman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d 307
(1955); Kotch v. Kotch, 151 Tex. 471, 251 S.W.2d 520 (1952).
31 See Davis v. Modern Indus. Bank, 279 N.Y. 405, 413-14, 18 N.E.2d 639,
642-43 (1939).
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tility of the life insurance investment has been increased by a num-
ber of influences, both legal and extra-legal,3 2 and the extraordinary
increase in the amount of life insurance in force testifies to the fact
that more and more people are attracted to this method of saving
and investment.3 3 Present difficulties and uncertainties result from a
failure to recognize that the interests which the law seeks to protect
are not only different, but also sometimes inconsistent, and some-
times even incompatible. An orderly scheme for regulating transfers
of interests in life insurance may require different methods for differ-
ent interests.
Transfer of the Right to Receive Death Benefits
Right to Change Beneficiary
Reservation to the insured of the right to change the beneficiary
has produced a kind of backlash in many courts. Policies containing
this reservation specify a procedure by which such changes are to be
accomplished and usually stipulate that such changes are not to take
effect until this procedure is fully carried out. Courts in many cases
made strict adherence to these contract terms a condition of the
effectiveness of any attempted change.34 This approach undoubtedly
was prompted in part by a desire to provide some protection to
beneficiaries whose interests had been so easily reduced from a vested
interest to a mere expectancy.3 5 Subsequently, however, the strict
compliance approach produced a counterreaction as courts, uncom-
fortable with a dogma requiring them at times to disregard the plain
intention of the insured, evolved a "substantial compliance" principle
rendering effective any attempted change in which the insured had
done all he reasonably could do to accomplish it. 36
The strict compliance versus substantial compliance controversy
has been amply documented.3 7 While it is possible to talk of two
views (majority and minority, strict and liberal), it is impossible to
make any geographic assignment of the different approaches. Those
32 The growth of the industry brought considerable competition among
insurers. Settlement options, conversion privileges and termination options
have become more favorable as a result of that competition. The modern
life policy, of course, may also include endowment and annuity provisions.
33 The total amount of life insurance in force has more than doubled in
in the last decade. INSTn'uTE OF Lir INSURANCE, LAFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 21
(1968).
34 E.g., Lewis v. Reed, 48 Cal. App. 742, 192 P. 335 (1920). See generally
Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 5, 28-30 (1951).
35 VANCE, supra note 21, at 683-91.
36 E.g., Warren v. Prudential Ins. Co., 138 Fla. 443, 189 So. 412 (1939);
see Boehne v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 224 Minn., 57, 73, 28 N.W.2d 54, 63 (1954).
37 E.g., VANCE, supra note 21, at 683-91; Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 5 (1951).
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who examined the problem exhaustively found that almost all courts
were strict in some cases and liberal in others, depending upon how
each court's sympathy was engaged by collateral factors.38  The
necessity for litigation in such instances is the regretable result of
this uncertainty. The insurer does not contest its obligation to pay,
and yet a fund readily available to pay expenses frequently accom-
panying the death of a breadwinner is tied up, sometimes forcing
liquidation of other assets under unfavorable conditions. Something
thought to be certain and available is rendered uncertain and unavail-
able at the time it is needed most.
The discomfort of the courts is easily appreciated. The revocable
beneficiary has no claim of right while the insured is alive. If the
contracting parties agree to a change in the policy, there is no doctrinal
ground on which a court can disregard their plainly evidenced in-
tention. On the other hand, the life insurance policy in most cases is
popularly and properly viewed as a family asset, paid for with family
resources and long regarded by the law as primarily a means of
financial protection for dependents. It is not surprising that courts
acknowledge and give effect to "a policy to forestall belated, informal
treatment of these serious economic affairs, which is generally
suspicious in appearance and nearly always confusing and litigious in
result."39 In a society that provides elaborate regulations for transfer
of interests in automobiles, television sets, yard goods and accounts
receivable, judges understandably are moved to insist on a modicum
of orderliness and regularity in the transfer of interests in such an
important form of family wealth.
Right to Assign
When policy forms were changed to include a reservation of right
in the insured to change the beneficiary, a reservation of right to
assign the policy customarily was added.40  If the first reservation
reduces the interest of the beneficiary to an expectancy, the second is
probably unnecessary 41 except in those jurisdictions still holding to
the idea that the beneficiary has a modified vested interest.42 In-
clusion of the express reference to assignments probably reflected an
38 See, e.g., VANcE, supra note 21, at 684; Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 5, 28-34
(1951).
39 Kotch v. Kotch, 151 Tex. 451, 477, 251 S.W.2d 520, 523 (1952).
40 See Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 579, 582, 103 P.2d
963, 965 (1940).
41 See, e.g., Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 579, 583, 103
P.2d 963, 966 (1940). See generally VANCE, supra note 21, at 679-83.
42 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 454-
55, 47 A.2d 340, 342-43 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946).
increasing awareness of the asset value of life policies43 and a desire
on the part of insurers to maintain a measure of control over trans-
fers for value. Whatever their reasons, insurers were issuing policies
stipulating two methods for altering or shifting interests. The meth-
ods were different, and courts treated them differently.44  Assign-
ment and limitations on power to assign are matters strictly be-
tween the parties to the agreement. If an assignment by an insured
does not conform to policy procedures, only the insurer is in a position
to protest.45 If a beneficiary objects that an assignment diminishes
or extinguishes his interest and that procedures for changing the
beneficiary have not been followed, the answer is that assignment and
change of beneficiary are different acts affecting a transfer of in-
terest.4
6
Once the idea is accepted that an assignment of a life policy is a
contract matter involving only the contracting parties, it follows that
such a transfer is to be governed by the rules and principles govern-
ing any other transfer of a chose in action. Motives of the assignor
are usually immaterial. Gratuitous assignments, properly executed,
are as effective as assignments for value. "Properly executed" in
this situation means executed in conformance with the requirements
of the Restatement of Contracts47 as opposed to the requirements
stated in the policy for accomplishing a change of beneficiary.48 The
curious result is that many of the same courts that have wrestled
mightily with strict compliance versus substantial compliance in
change of beneficiary situations have had little difficulty enforcing
parol inter vivos gifts of life policies executed in the most informal
and ambiguous manner.49 Since assignment passes title in the chose
43 As early as 1911, Mr. Justice Holmes cautioned against rigid rules
that might diminish the value of "one of the best recognized forms of invest-
ment and self-compelled saving." Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911).
44 VANCE, supra note 21, at 681 & n.22.
45 See Munn v. Robison, 203 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1953); Hamilton v.
Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 290, 51 So. 2d 13, 18 (1950); Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
Ulery, 149 So. 2d 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340, 344 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Bourne v.
Haynes, 235 N.Y.S.2d 332, 334 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
46 See Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Clark, 81 Cal. App. 546, 553,
254 P. 306, 309 (1927); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450,
456, 47 A.2d 340, 343 (Ct. Err. & App., 1946); VANcE, supra note 21, at 681.
47 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 157, 158 (1932). These sections state
generally that rights can be assigned in writing or orally and that a gratuitous
assignment of rights in a life insurance policy is effective and irrevocable if
accompanied by a delivery of the policy.
48 Jennings v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 246 Ala. 689, 22 So. 2d
319 (1945). See generally Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 283-85 (1954).
49 See, e.g., Munn v. Robison, 203 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1953); Clarke v.
Edwards, 261 Ala. 544, 547, 74 So. 2d 912, 915 (1954); cf. Sheeler v. Sheeler,
207 Md. 264, 270, 114 A.2d 62, 64 (1955).
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in action to the assignee, the donee of an inter vivos gift steps into a
position at least as strong as that of the irrevocable beneficiary,
though the face of the contract is innocent of any indication of his
"vested interest."
In one sense this development was a natural, if not inevitable
result. Recognition of a life policy as an asset, a form of investment,
carried with it ideas of ownership. Incidents of ownership of choses
in action such as life policies take many forms and may be conferred
or relinquished by agreement, rescission, renunciation, assignment or
the versatile and elastic concept of equitable assignment. But one
who invests in such an asset should be entitled to enjoy the benefits
accruing from it and to deal with it in the manner in which he chooses.
The law has no broad franchise either to take or to diminish the
value of one's investment merely on the basis of its form, in order to
enforce a vaguely defined public policy in favor of dependents. It
should be noted as well that incidents of ownership in life policies
frequently are inconsistent and contradictory. This is due in part to
the nature of the interests and in part to the fact that few transfers
of interest in property are conducted at a higher level of ignorance
and inattentiveness. The ordinary citizen has only a dim notion of
the nature of a life insurance contract and the implications of his acts
affecting it. Professionals who should know more about these con-
siderations than does the layman too often pay little attention to his
actions.
Consider the following: Husband applies for a life insurance
policy in which his wife is to be the named beneficiary. The appli-
cation offers him the option of reserving the right to change the
beneficiary, which option he elects more or less intelligently. He
may, fleetingly, acknowledge the possibility that his wife will leave
him, in which case he may wish to make his aging mother or spinster
daughter his beneficiary. He probably knows that, if in need of money
he can make a policy loan or, as a last resort, "cash in" the policy and
take its cash surrender value. He might know that the policy can be
acceptable collateral for a bank loan, and that it might be saleable to
a third party, conceivably for a larger amount than the cash surrender
value. Having made this commendable investment, he takes the policy
home, presses it into his wife's hands, and says, "Here, my sweet, this
is for you. If anything happens to me, it will take care of you and the
children." His wife responds, "Thank you, dear. You're so thought-
ful. Now you take it back for safekeeping." The skeptical mind can-
not but wonder what the husband's reaction would be if his wife
responded, "Thank you, dear, for your parol inter vivos gift that vests
50 See Davis v. Modern Indus. Bank, 279 N.Y. 405, 414, 18 N.E.2d 639,
643 (1939).
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title to this chose in action in me and, therefore, extinguishes your
independent power to change the beneficiary,51 encumber the policy
with a policy loan,52 assign it for value53 or take the cash surrender
value." 54  When the result of this transaction is the protection of
the wife against her husband's late-life foolishness,55 it would appear
that justice has been done. When parol gift analysis is used to favor
adult children over a second wife-widow, 56 it raises some doubts.
When it is used as a complete bar to the claim of a subsequent as-
signee for value, it produces genuine misgivings. 57
Present intention to make a gift must, of course, accompany the
transfer of the policy, but "intention" in such a setting is tricky.
Ordinary citizens do not think or "intend" in sophisticated legal con-
cepts.58  The hypothetical husband understood and believed he had
inaugurated a sound investment for the benefit of his wife. He
probably had no present intention to take lifetime benefits for him-
self. But if he had been fully aware of what he was doing, and
consciously intended to surrender control of the policy and its life-
time benefits, it would have been simpler, cleaner and surer for him
to have designated his wife as an irrevocable beneficiary in the policy
itself. A parol gift of life insurance to the named beneficiary is sus-
picious simply because it is such a clumsy way for an insured to carry
out his presumed intention.59
A parol gift of the policy to someone other than the named
beneficiary is equally a source of unfortunate consequences. There
is less reason to doubt that the insured intends to transfer the right to
51 E.g., Clarke v. Edwards, 261 Ala. 544, 74 So. 2d 912 (1954); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340 (Ct. Err. & App.
1946); Bourne v. Haynes, 235 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1962); see Katzman v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d 307 (1955).
52 Elledge v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 241 Ark. 106, 406 S.W.2d 374 (1966)
(dictum).
53 Munn v. Robison, 203 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1953).
54 Cf. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 51 So. 2d 13 (1950).
55 E.g., Katzman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d 307
(1955).
56 E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340
(Ct. Err. & App. 1946).
57 E.g., Munn v. Robison, 203 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1953).
58 See L. FULLER & R. BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 67 (1964).
59 Borchert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
is an example of the confusion often surrounding informal assignments. The
wife alleged that her husband obtained possession of a previously assigned
policy by fraudulently representing that he wished to make a policy loan.
What the wife plainly did not understand was that if the policy had been as-
signed to her, only she was entitled to use the policy for such a purpose; sim-
ple surrender of possession is meaningless. The court concluded she was the
owner, apparently giving no weight to her inconsistent actions.
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the death benefits in these cases, but this change of beneficiary not
only fails to conform to specified policy procedures but may be totally
undocumented. 60 Of course, more than a change of beneficiary is in-
volved. Since the parol gift transfers title and gives the donee a
vested interest, the donee will prevail not only against a beneficiary
named before the gift,61 but also against one named thereafter in even
the most meticulously executed change of beneficiary.62 The in-
sured's intention to surrender lifetime benefits and control is no
more clear in these cases than in gifts to the named beneficiary, and
the root problem of proving a particular intention is always present.
Intention on the part of the insured-donor to make a present gift
must be proved and the burden is on the one claiming as a donee .
3
The job of divining this elusive intention is made no easier by the
fact that the critical actions were usually taken long before by one
who is now dead,64 and intent is frequently found by a rather selective
marshalling of facts and circumstances. The fact that the donee paid
all or some of the premiums may prove that he regarded the policy
as his property, or it may prove only that he regarded his interest as
beneficiary worth preserving.65 The fact that the donee has possession
of the policy may indicate delivery, but it is not markedly probative
when the donor (husband) and donee (wife) lived together and the
policy was found in their residence.66 If it appears that the policy
was in fact in possession of the donor, such possession can be ex-
plained by testimony that it was returned to him for safekeeping
67
60 See, e.g., Clark v. Edwards, 261 Ala. 544, 74 So. 2d 912 (1954).
61 E.g., Clarke v. Edwards, 261 Ala. 544, 74 So. 2d 912 (1954); Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Grant, 54 N.J. Eq. 208, 33 A. 1060 (Ch. 1896); Bourne v. Haynes,
235 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
62 E.g., Borchert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup.
Ct. 1948); cf. Sheeler v. Sheeler, 207 Md. 264, 114 A.2d 62 (1955); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946).
63 Blackburn v. Merchants Life Ins. Co., 90 Cal. App. 362, 364 (1928).
See also Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 325 (1954).
64 The respective Dead Man's Statutes rendering inadmissable testimony
of transactions with one presently deceased have been of little effect in these
cases. The usual reason seems to be that in contests between two parties
claiming death benefits, the estate of the deceased is not really involved, and
in no event will the estate of the deceased be diminished. Grasso v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 206 Pa. Super. 562, 214 A.2d 261 (1965); cf. In re
Estate of Sear, 182 Cal. App. 2d 525, 531-32, 6 Cal. Rptr. 148, 152 (1960). See
generally Annot., 122 A.L.R. 1297 (1939).
65 E.g., Ratsch v. Rengel, 180 Md. 196, 201, 23 A.2d 680, 682 (1942); Wol-
pert v. O'Brien, 85 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
66 See Munn v. Robison, 203 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1953).
67 Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 289-90, 51 So. 2d 13, 18 (1950);
see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1946).
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or that he regained possession by stealth6s or trickery.6 9 In fact,
other circumstances may make proof of actual delivery unneces-
sary °7 0 and the court's decision may be influenced by the fact that
death benefits frequently will be sheltered from the claims of the
deceased's creditors,7 1 or simply by sympathy for a dependent.
72
Conflicting Ownership Interests
As familiarity with the investment potential of life insurance
has grown, so has its use in situations in which questions of con-
flicting interests may arise. Business organizations, wives, ex-wives,
children, parents and other relatives all may depend in one way
or another on the life of a single individual and wish to protect their
interests by investment in insurance on his life. Incidents of owner-
ship may be as varied as these interests.
Morrison v. Mutual Life Insurance Company73 is a leading illus-
tration of the importance of the notion of ownership in connection
with life insurance. The husband applied for and was issued a policy
in which his wife was the named beneficiary and which by its terms
reserved to him the right to change the beneficiary and to take the
cash surrender value. When the husband died, his wife demanded the
death benefits and was told that the husband had already surrendered
the policy. In this action against the insurer, the evidence showed that
the wife had wanted the policy and that the husband had applied for
it only after the wife agreed to pay the premiums. In addition to
paying all premiums, the wife had held the policy until her husband
obtained possession of it by stealth. Admitting that, by the face of
the policy, the wife's interest was only an expectancy,7 4 the court
held that on the evidence presented the wife was the "owner" of the
policy as against the husband.75 If she had known what was occur-
68 See, e.g., Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 579, 103 P.2d
963 (1940).
69 See, e.g., Borchert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup.
Ct. 1948).
70 E.g., Ratsch v. Rengel, 180 Md. 196, 201-02, 23 A.2d 680, 682 (1942).
71 E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 156 F. Supp. 765 (D. Md.
1957); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Grant, 54 N.J. Eq. 208, 33 A. 1060 (Ch. 1896); cf.
Wolpert v. O'Brien, 85 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
72 In Katzman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 202-05, 128 N.E.2d
307, 309-11 (1955), the New York Court of Appeals upheld the interests of
the donee under a parol inter vivos gift in the face of a statute, N.Y. PERs.
PROP. LAw § 31 (McKinney 1962), providing "a contract to assign or an as-
signment ... of a life insurance policy, or a promise ... to name a bene-
ficiary of any such policy is void unless in writing, signed by the party to be
charged." (Emphasis added).
73 15 Cal. 2d 579, 103 P.2d 963 (1940).
74 Id. at 583, 103 P.2d at 966.
75 Id. at 586-87, 103 P.2d at 967.
[VOL 20
May 1969J INTERESTS IN LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
ring, she could have prevented him from surrendering the policy,
and if the insurer had notice of her ownership, it was bound to
recognize it. The lower court thus erred in excluding evidence that
such notice had been given.76 The court saw no occasion for refined
analysis. The policy was owned by the wife on any one of three
grounds: By virtue of the agreement with her husband; because
she was assignee of a chose in action assigned to her by her husband;
or simply because it was property she had purchased and paid for.
7
From the transfer of an interest by assignment or parol inter
vivos gift, it is only a short step to equitable assignment and the
transfer, alteration, or extinguishment of an ownership interest by
agreement outside the insurance contract. The increasing brittleness
of the marriage relationship has made a singular contribution to
this body of insurance jurisprudence.
Property Settlement Agreements
Transfer of Interest
It seems settled almost without dissent that a separation or other
property settlement agreement in which one of the parties agrees to
maintain a life insurance policy for the benefit of the other vests in
the latter an "equitable interest" or "equitable right" that cannot be
divested without his consent.7 8  Subsequent attempts to change the
beneficiary are ineffective;7 9 taking the cash surrender value may
be a conversion;80 allowing the policy to lapse is a breach of agree-
ment for which damages in the face amount of the policy are allowed
to the party aggrieved; 81 and encumbering the policy has been indi-
76 Id. at 589, 103 P.2d at 968.
77 Id. at 587, 103 P.2d at 967; accord, e.g., National Metropolitan Bank
v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 773 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Ratsch v. Rengel, 180 Md. 196,
23 A.2d 680 (1942).
78 E.g., Williams v. Williams, 276 Ala. 43, 46, 158 So. 2d 901, 903 (1963);
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 289-90, 51 So. 2d 13, 18 (1950); Elledge v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 241 Ark. 106, 113, 406 S.W.2d 374, 379 (1966); Waxman v.
Citizens' Natl Trust & Say. Bank, 123 Cal. App. 2d 145, 148, 266 P.2d 48, 50
(1954); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Franck, 9 Cal. App. 2d 528, 535-36, 50 P.2d 480,
483-84 (1935); Shoudy v. Shoudy, 55 Cal. App. 344, 351, 203 P. 433, 436 (1921);
Hasselberger v. Hasselberger, 102 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Campbell
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 262, 267, 137 N.E.2d 515, 519
(Ct. App. 1955). But see Cadore v. Cadore, 67 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 1953).
79 E.g., Williams v. Williams, 276 Ala. 43, 46-47, 158 So. 2d 901, 903
(1963); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Franck, 9 Cal. App. 2d 528, 537, 50 P.2d 480, 484
(1935); Shoudy v. Shoudy, 55 Cal. App. 344, 352, 203 P. 433, 436 (1921); Camp-
bell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 73 Ohio L. Abs. 262, 267, 137 N.E.2d 515, 519 (Ct.
App. 1955).
80 E.g., Hamilton v. Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 291, 51 So. 2d 13, 20 (1950).
81 E.g., Waxman v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank, 123 Cal. App. 2d
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cated to be a breach of agreement chargeable to the defaulting party
or his estate.8
2
Difficulties, where they appear, proceed from the fact that while
the separation agreement may be very formal and even incorporated
into a divorce decree, the insurance contract remains unchanged.
The policy continues to show an insured in whom the right to change
the beneficiary is reserved, which in turn signifies that the insured
still "owns" the policy. Since assignment in the strict sense is not
involved, courts are less particular about delivery and possession.
83
Indeed, the language of "waiver"8 4 and "estoppel '8 5 is sometimes
used to describe or explain the consequences imposed. Only the
intervention of third parties who claim to have given value for their
interests prompts close attention to the character and extent of the
equitable interests created.
8 6
In the case of property settlement agreements, as with parol gifts,
the intentions of the parties are often poorly formulated. Separation
agreements commonly deal with two subjects: Support obligations of
the husband and division of property. If the parties understand and
intend that a life policy is an item of property to be allocated to one
of them, they will deal with it in a manner appropriate to such a
transfer of interest. If they understand and intend that life insur-
ance is to be used to fortify support obligations, the arrangements
will be quite different. If intention is unclear and the principals
uninformed as to the nature of the interest with which they are
dealing, the consequences may be completely unanticipated.
In Waxman v. Citizens National Trust and Savings Bank,8 7 for
example, there is reason to believe the husband-insured understood
that his obligations with respect to life insurance were coextensive
with his support obligations. If he had realized that his promise to
145, 149, 266 P.2d 48, 50-51 (1954).
82 Cf. Elledge v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 241 Ark. 106, 406 S.W.2d 374 (1966).
83 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Franck, 9 Cal. App. 2d 528, 50 P.2d 480 (1935);
Hasselberger v. Hasselberger, 102 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Contra, Cadore
v. Cadore, 67 So. 2d 635, 658 (Fla. 1953), in which the court took particular
notice of the fact that the beneficiaries of the contract promise permitted the
insured to retain possession of the policy in such form as to lead third parties
and the insurer to believe he retained all his rights in it.
84 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Franck, 9 Cal. App. 2d 528, 538, 50 P.2d 480,
484 (1935).
85 Campbell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 73 Ohio L. Abs. 262, 267, 137 N.E.2d
515, 519 (Ct. App. 1955).
86 See, e.g., Shoudy v. Shoudy, 55 Cal. App. 344, 352-53, 203 P. 433, 436-
37 (1921); Campbell v. Prudential Ins. Co., 73 Ohio L. Abs. 262, 267, 137 N.E.2d
515, 519 (Ct. App. 1955). See also Cadore v. Cadore, 67 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla.
1953).
87 123 Cal. App. 2d 415, 266 P.2d 48 (1954).
1188 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 20
May 1969] INTERESTS IN LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
keep life insurance in effect for the benefit of his daughter was a
transfer of an interest to her, obligating him to pay premiums and
keep the policy in force even after she was grown and married, he
might have insisted on a more limited undertaking. On the other
hand, in Cooper v. Cooper,8 8 a promise in a separation agreement to
maintain insurance for the benefit of children was regarded as so
intimately connected to the support obligation that since this promise
was not "self-executing," and since the divorce decree stated that the
support agreement had been fully consummated, the court concluded
that the insurance promise had been abandoned.
Much misunderstanding and uncertainty would be avoided in
transactions of this kind if the parties focused their attention on the
insurance contract directly as well as on the separation agreement
generally. If the parties intend that the husband is to undertake an
unqualified obligation for the benefit of the (ex) wife or child, that
intention can be manifested in the policy by making the beneficiary
irrevocable. If they intend that this benefit is to extend only so long
as the wife does not remarry or as long as a child is a minor, the
policy can be made to reflect that intention. To effect such a result,
the wife, for example, can be designated a conditional primary bene-
ficiary with the estate of the insured as a secondary beneficiary. The
very act of amending the policy will require the parties to address
themselves to the issue of the precise disposition to be made of their
common interest in the life insurance rather than permitting inaction
to necessitate reliance on offhand references which some court must
later interpret under the most difficult conditions. When the policy is
amended, the insurer will be on notice of all interests if the insured
later, through dishonest motive or simple misunderstanding, attempts
to make a policy loan or surrender the policy. Similarly, third parties
considering purchasing the policy or accepting it as collateral are in a
position to see what they are getting if they merely take the simple
precaution of looking at the face of the proffered item.
89
88 49 Cal. 2d 30, 314 P.2d 1 (1957).
89 It might be noted that at least one commentator has suggested that an
assignment of life insurance paid for by community property funds, pursuant
to a separation agreement, may be a purchase for value by the assignee, ren-
dering death benefits taxable as income in some circumstances under section
101 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code. R. RicE, FAmvLy TAX PLANNING 454
(1968). Apparently some members of Congress agree. It is reported that
since 1962, bills have been introduced each year designed to enlarge the class
of persons to whom transfers for value of life policies can be made without
resulting income tax liability. Osborn, Gifts of Life Insurance as an Element
in Estate Planning, N.Y.U. 26Ta INST. ON FED. TAx. 1335, 1349 n.52 (1968).
This hazard is, of course, present whether the transfer is done well or clum-




Separation agreements in which one party (usually the wife)
renounces existing interests have received much closer scrutiny
than those creating vested interests in life policies. Understandably,
most cases originate in community property states. If a life policy is
community property and if the wife is the named beneficiary, reser-
vation to the husband-insured of the right to change the beneficiary
notwithstanding, a change of beneficiary without her consent and
without valuable consideration is voidable, and the wife can maintain
an action for her share of the death benefits at the husband's death 0
A wife may release her community interest and still be entitled to
the death benefits if she continues as the named beneficiary; 91
correspondingly, she can, by separate agreement, renounce her claim
to the death benefits even though she continues to be named as
beneficiary in the policy.92 The principal problem is: What did the
parties intend when a property settlement agreement, which in one
way or another indicates that the wife has renounced her interest
in a life policy, contradicts the life policy which still names her as the
beneficiary? A series of California decisions provides an interesting
study in the public policy considerations felt by courts in this situ-
ation.
In 1931, in Jenkins v. Jenkins,93 the bistrict Court of Appeals for
the First District was confronted with a property settlement agree-
ment in which the wife released and relinquished "all right, title and
interest and claim of any kind or nature . .. in or to any property
which shall be a part of the estate of [the husband] . . . or property
of any kind acquired by [the husband] in which [the wife] but
for this agreement might now or hereafter have any interest."9 4 The
agreement also provided, however, that it was based on represen-
tations that an attached list included all the property the husband
possessed. Not listed was a life policy in which the wife continued
to be named as beneficiary. The court held that by its terms the
agreement did not apply to the insurance policy, and accompanied
its decision with a strong statement of the policy favoring enforcement
of life insurance policies according to their terms. If the terms of
insurance contracts were susceptible to attack, the court indicated,
90 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Fancher, 219 Cal. 351, 26 P.2d 482 (1933); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 P. 61 (1923). See
generally Thurman, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Community Property
Life Insurance, 9 STAN. L. REV. 239, 249-52 (1956).
91 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 175, 157 P.2d 841, 842 (1945).
92 Sullivan v. Union Oil Co., 16 Cal. 2d 229, 237, 105 P.2d 922, 927
(1940).
93 112 Cal. App. 402, 297 P. 56 (1931).
94 Id. at 406, 297 P. at 58.
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delays and uncertainty would surely result. "The designation of
beneficiary would mean nothing and the beneficent objects of life
insurance would be thwarted. 95
In 1940, in Sullivan v. Union Oil Company,96 the Supreme Court
of California was faced with a similar problem with some interesting
variations. The property involved was the husband's contribution to
a company-managed employee retirement fund. Rules of the plan
directed that if, as happened here, the employee died before becoming
eligible for retirement, his contribution was to be returned to the
one named by the employee as beneficiary. The property settlement
agreement provided that the wife relinquished all rights in her hus-
band's estate and in community property. It also specified that it
was designed to settle the rights of the parties "in all respects" and
to be a full and final settlement of all property rights.97 Neverthe-
less, the husband never changed the life policy designation of his wife
as beneficiary. The supreme court held that Jenkins was distinguish-
able on the ground that the fund in this case was clearly within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the agreement was made.98
The opinion proceeded to scold the district court of appeals for de-
ciding Jenkins "for the express purpose of declaring what should be a
good business policy" and thus departing from "the conceived func-
tions of an appellate court."99  Less emphasis was placed on the
above mentioned distinction than on the fact that the separation agree-
ment plainly expressed the parties' intention to settle all their respec-
tive rights. An insurance policy, said the court, is a contract and as
such, an item of property.10° When the parties state they are settling
all their property rights, the court should take them at their word.
Insurance policies and rights thereunder, it added, are not sacred or
untouchable. 191
In 1945, in Grimm v. Grimm, 0 2 the California Supreme Court
repented its slighting remarks about insurance policies and the in-
terests therein. Consequently, Sullivan plus-or-minus Grimm set in
motion one of those lines of authority a lawyer can never explain to
his clients. The property settlement agreement in Grimm identified
certain items of property that were to be the separate property of
the husband and as to these provided that the wife "hereby conveys,
95 Id. at 411, 297 P. at 60.
90 16 Cal. 2 d 229, 105 P.2d 922 (1940).
97 Id. at 233, 105 P.2d at 924-5.
98 Id. at 234-36, 237, 105 P.2d at 925-26, 927.
99 Id. at 236-37, 105 P.2d at 926.
100 Id. at 237, 105 P.2d at 927.
101 Id.
102 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945).
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relinquishes and releases . . . all right, title, interest and claim."' 03
The life policy was one of the items identified, and a particular refer-
ence to it stated that the wife "hereby transfers, releases and re-
linquishes [to the husband] all interest in and to said policy of
insurance and the premiums paid thereunder and the avails
thereof."'1 4  The husband was to have the right to change the
beneficiary and the wife agreed to execute any necessary or "con-
venient" documents. 10 5 The husband lived more than two years after
the execution of the agreement but never changed the beneficiary.
In its decision the court focused on the fact that a beneficiary's
interest is an expectancy. Just as a wife may relinquish her rights of
inheritance and still take under her husband's will, she may release
her community share in a life insurance policy and still receive death
benefits if her husband chooses to retain her as the named bene-
ficiary.10 6 Starting with the broad proposition that the purpose of a
property settlement is the segregation of "property" and that general
expressions are not to be construed as assignments or renunciations
of expectancies,' 07 the court found only an intention to release the
wife's community share in the policy 08 A vigorous dissent noted
the language of conveyance and transfer used in the agreement and
insisted that a transfer of an interest in the "avails" of the policy is
more than a relinquishment. 10 9
In 1953, Thorp v. Randazzo'" presented a situation distinguish-
able from Grimm only in that the wife waived all claim to benefits
she might have at the time "or which may hereafter be derived from""'
the specified policies, and executed a blank change of beneficiary
form, which the husband never used. This, said the court, con-
stituted a present divestment of claims she might otherwise have
had.11 2 The emphasis on "present divestment" is interesting since
the court obviously was influenced by events occurring between the
time of the agreement and the time of the husband's death. All in
all there was ample justification for the position asserted by a court
103 Id. at 178, 157 P.2d at 844.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 It is interesting to note than in Sullivan the analogue employed by
the court was relinquishment of rights in an automobile, 16 Cal. 2d at 238,
105 P.2d 927, while in Grimm the comparison was with surrender of a right to
take under a will. 26 Cal. 2d at 179, 157 P.2d at 844.
107 In at least one case this generalization alone was sufficient reason
for the decision. Mayberry v. Kathan, 232 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
108 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 179, 157 P.2d 841, 844 (1945).
109 Id. at 180-81, 157 P.2d at 845.
110 41 Cal. 2d 770, 264 P.2d 38 (1953).
Il Id. at 774, 264 P.2d at 40.
112 Id. at 776, 264 P.2d at 41-42.
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ruling subsequent to Thorp that the controlling question in these cases
is "What did the parties intend?" and that this is a question of fact.113
The "question of fact" approach makes available the whole
range of extrinsic facts and the same opportunities for selective de-
ployment of circumstances and inferences as in the parol gift cases.
1 1 4
In Thorp the court clearly was influenced by evidence that the hus-
band mistakenly believed the policy had terminated, that this mis-
taken belief explained his failure to change the beneficiary rather
than a desire to give the benefits to his former wife." 5 If facts indi-
cate that husband-insured was familiar with procedures for changing
the beneficiary, his failure to follow these procedures in the particular
instance may show he did not intend that the beneficiary be
changed." 6 The amount of time elapsing between the separation
agreement and the death of the insured may" 7 or may not"8 indicate
an intention to retain a former wife as the beneficiary. Specific refer-
ences to policies may be more convincing than general references to
life insurance." 9 Continued friendly relations between the parties,
120
the presence or absence of secondary beneficiaries 121 and the re-
lationship to the insured of the contending parties 22 all may influ-
ence determination of this question of fact.
113 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Broadhurst, 157 Cal. App. 2d 375,
378, 321 P.2d 75, 77 (1958).
114 See text accompanying notes 33-56 supra.
15 41 Cal. 2d at 776, 264 P.2d at 42. The case is also an illustration of
lay ignorance of the terms of life policies. The insured plainly assumed he had
lost everything when he defaulted on premium payments. In fact, the auto-
matic extended term option had been exercised, and he had several years of
coverage at the face amount of the policy.
116 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Broadhurst, 157 Cal. App. 2d 375,
379, 321 P.2d 75, 77-78 (1958).
117 Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945) (more than 3
years); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Broadhurst, 157 Cal. App. 2d 375, 321 P.2d 75
(1958) (more than 2 years).
118 Baekgaard v. Carreiro, 237 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1956) (more than 2
years).
119 Compare Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Hartshorn, 238 F.2d 417
(9th Cir. 1956), with O'Brien v. Elder, 250 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1957), and May-
berry v. Kathan, 232 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1956). In the O'Brien case the dis-
senting judge objected to reliance on California cases on the theory that in
community property states a wife clearly has a "claim" to surrender, a prop-
osition not true in noncommunity property jurisdictions. 250 F.2d at 280.
120 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Hartshorn, 238 F.2d 417, 426 (9th
Cir. 1956); cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Broadhurst, 157 Cal. App. 2d 375, 321 P.2d
75 (1958) (no friendly relations); Miller v. Miller, 94 Cal. App. 2d 785, 211
P.2d 357 (1949) (no friendly relations).
121 Baekgaard v. Carreiro, 237 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1956).
122 Cf. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Hartshorn, 238 F.2d 417 (9th
Cir. 1956); Miller v. Miller, 94 Cal. App. 2d 785, 211 P.2d 357 (1949).
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There is no talismanic phrase for property settlement agreements
that will make intention plain and put all questions to rest. If, how-
ever, the parties are advised concerning the consequences of their
activities, the policy can be made to speak clearly. Amendment of
the policy to reflect the informed intention of the parties should be a
part of the property settlement transaction. The problem is not
getting any smaller. Group life insurance is growing at a faster rate
than ordinary life insurance 123 and may provide even more delicate
problems of sorting out interests. Group policies frequently have
standard beneficiary clauses stipulating that in the absence of a
designated beneficiary, or in the event the designated beneficiary
predeceases the insured, death benefits will be paid to the spouse,
children, parents or brothers and sisters in that order. The failure
of an insured to change the designated beneficiary of a group policy
is a much less reliable index of intention. If the insured believes his
former wife has renounced her right to death benefits, he may also
believe that the standard beneficiary clause in the group policy results
in the disposition he favors-death benefits to his children or to a
later wife if he remarries.
124
Business Interests
Business organizations have a number of interests in individual
lives for which life insurance can provide appropriate protection.
Policies on the lives of key men and policies used to fund business
purchase agreements are the most common forms of this type of
coverage. 25 In these situations courts have consistently looked both
to the insurance policy and to the underlying agreement in the process
of determining where ownership or beneficial interest lies.126  As
often as not the terms of the policy obscure rather than illuminate
the parties' intentions.
Wellhouse v. United Paper Company 27 concerned a policy issued
on the life of a corporation executive ("key-man" insurance). Appli-
cation had been made by the executive pursuant to an agreement
with the corporation. The corporation paid the premiums and re-
tained possession of the policy, but the right to change the beneficiary
was reserved in the policy to the insured executive. When the insured
123 INSTITUTE OF LIF INSURANCE, LIME INSURANCE FACT BooK 20-21 (1968).
In the last decade the amount of group life insurance in force has almost
tripled, from $133.8 billion at the end of 1957 to $391 billion at the end of 1967.
Id. at 21.
124 E.g., Miller v. Miller, 94 Cal. App. 2d 785, 211 P.2d 357 (1949).
126 See VANCE, supra note 21, at 197-98.
126 E.g., Wellhouse v. United Paper Co., 29 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1929);
Morgan v. E.J. Evans Co., 266 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1959).
127 29 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1929).
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terminated his connection with the company, he attempted to change
the beneficial interest to his wife. The court held he had no power
to change the beneficiary.12 8 The corporation owned the policy and
all its incidents and benefits. Any right held by the insured was by
the terms of the policy held "in trust" for the corporation.
129
In Morgan v. E.J. Evans Company130 the situation was sub-
stantially the same as that in Wellhouse except that the policy was a
combination endowment and life policy. If it matured as an endow-
ment policy, benefits were to be paid to the insured. If he died before
the endowment matured, death benefits were to be paid to the corpo-
ration. This, the court held, distinguished it from Wellhouse.1
8 1
Since the company was only a conditional beneficiary, ownership was
not in it alone. The precise question, however, was whether the com-
pany could take the cash surrender value after the insured had left
the organization and had given a release for value of "all debts,
demands, claims of whatsoever kind and nature .... ,,132
The fact that in Morgan the executive was favored with an en-
dowment feature in his policy makes it no less an investment in him
by the company than was the policy in Wellhouse. If an effort to
surrender the policy was made while the insured was still with the
company, one might argue that this was a breach of contract or a
violation of rights acquired under an "equitable assignment." Once
he left, there seems little reason to deny the company the right to
realize the asset value of its investment. The decision represents a
dubious analysis of interests in the policy. Incidents of ownership
were markedly in the corporation, and if ownership of life insurance
as an asset means anything, it should mean power in the investor to
withdraw his investment when it ceases to serve the purpose for
which it was made. An unfortunate aspect of Morgan is that the
problem need never have arisen. If this eventuality had been called
to the attention of the parties at the time the arrangement was made,
the policy (or the underlying agreement) could have specifically re-
served to the company the right to take the cash surrender value in
such circumstances as those which ultimately transpired. Sometimes
even businessmen are not aware of the variety of interests reposing
in life policies.
The subject of business purchase agreements funded by life insur-
128 Id. at 887.
129 Id.
180 266 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1959).
131 Id. at 426.
132 Id. at 425. The court concluded that the interest in the policy was
not a debt, demand or claim against the company and therefore was unaffected
by the release. Id. at 27.
ance is beyond the scope of detailed treatment by this article.
133 It
should, however, be noted that this is an area in which careful co-
ordination of the base agreement with the policy terms is of critical
importance. Agreements of this kind are found most frequently in
partnerships and closely held corporations, and they serve two dis-
tinct but complementary functions. An agreement among partners,
for example, that if one dies the other can and shall purchase his
interest from his estate helps to assure continuity of the organization
with a minimum of disruption, and at the same time provides that
his dependents will receive the value of his interest with a minimum
of delay and inconvenience. Backing such an agreement with insur-
ance on the partners' lives to provide the funds for this transaction
advances both objectives.
Where insurance is procured pursuant to such an agreement,
parties to the agreement probably have a "vested" interest in the
policy which the insured cannot affect by independent action.
34
However, reliance should not be placed entirely on this broad propo-
sition. Common sense advises against tempting an insured with loan
privileges and cash surrender value when attention to policy terms
and control can preclude such complications. 35 If the arrangement
is one in which the organization pays the premiums and manages the
insurance, there is every advantage in having the policies indicate
this ownership as plainly as possible in the original terms'3 0 or by
endorsement.
3 7
Whether the parties use cross-purchase agreements (wherein each
partner or stockholder has a policy on the life of every other partner
or stockholder) or entity agreements (wherein the organization has a
policy on the life of every partner or stockholder), whether each
pays premiums on his own policy or premiums are paid by the
organization, and whether other parties, the organization or depend-
ents are named as beneficiaries, will depend upon and vary with the
ages, financial status or particular condition of those interested.
3 8
133 See generally C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATES AND GIFT
TAXES 869-76 (2d ed. 1962); Fahr, The Business Purchase Agreement and Life
Insurance, 15 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 319 (1950); Johnson, Problems of Busi-
ness Insurance, 4 UTAH L. REv. 1 (1954).
134 See First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 358 F.2d 625, 630 (5th Cir.
1966); cf. Brand v. Erisman, 172 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
135 Fahr, The Business Purchase Agreement and Life Insurance, 15 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 319, 333 (1950).
136 Many application forms now contain a blank where the "owner" of
the policy may be named when the owner is someone other than the insured.
137 See Kidd v. Patterson, 230 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
138 C. LowNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 871-72 (2d
ed. 1962); Fahr, The Business Purchase Agreement and Life Insurance, 15
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 319, 325-35 (1950).
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Among the major problems to be kept in mind are potential tax prob-
lems. We venture into that forbidding thicket only far enough to
emphasize a single principle: It is the height of folly to invite un-
expected and costly tax consequences by leaving meaningless inci-
dents of ownership in life policies unexplained.
13 9
Estate Tax Consequences of Ownership Concepts
If, as the court stated in First National Bank v. United States, 40
a life insurance business purchase agreement vests in the parties to
the agreement an interest that the insured cannot defeat by changing
the beneficiary, even though the policy reserves that right to him,
there is little reason for the policy to include such a reservation.
If there is a chance, however slight, that reserving such an incident of
ownership may result in both the proceeds of the policy and the
value of his interest in the business being included in his estate for
estate tax purposes, its reservation is rather clear evidence of poor
business and tax planning.141 If the reservation is included inad-
vertently (because no one reads or pays attention to the standard
terms in an insurance policy), it is a disgrace.
The focus of section 2042 of the Internal Revenue Code' 42 is on
"ownership," but the term is used in a distinctive, almost equivocal
sense. Certain "incidents" are the equivalent of ownership for these
purposes, with only a passing regard shown for contrary incidents of
equal or greater substance.143  Where a corporation executive
.3) INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2042 provides that the proceeds (death bene-
fits) of life insurance shall be included in a decedent's gross estate for estate
tax purposes: "(1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR-To the extent of
the amount receivable by the Executor as insurance under policies on the
life of the decedent.
"(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES-To the extent of the
amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on
the life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his
death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in con-
junction with any other person." Under section 2042, the "incidents of owner-
ship" are said to refer to any right in the insured or his estate to the "economic
benefits" of the policy and include the power to change the beneficiary, to
surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy or revoke an assignment,
to pledge the policy for a loan or make a policy loan. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-
1(c) (2) (1958).
140 358 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1966); see text accompanying notes 134-37
supra.
141 The danger of this double estate taxation is probably slight. C.
LOWNDES & R. KRAwmE, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAxEs 872-73 (2d ed. 1962).
But as long as there is any danger at all, plus the possibility of delay and
irritation, simple precautions seem in order. Fahr, The Business Purchase
Agreement and Life Insurance, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 319, 333-34 (1950).
142 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2042.
143 Id. § 2042(2).
named the corporation as beneficiary of a life insurance policy but
reserved the right to change the beneficiary, that "incident" made
the death benefits includible in his estate even though the corpo-
ration paid the premiums, maintained possession of the policy, used
it as collateral for a loan and collected and kept the death benefits.
144
The court concluded that the insured acted deliberately, intending to
reserve this privilege for himself.1 45 That being true, it was imma-
terial that the corporation might have prevented him from changing
the beneficiary on the policy it owned or that such a change, if made,
would be ineffective against the corporation.
With some limited exceptions, courts have approached split-level
ownership of life policies bluntly. In Rhode Island Hospital Trust
Company v. United States146 the court noted that section 2042
addresses itself to "powers," not to rights in a broad sense. If, for
example, by the terms of the policy the insured has power to change
the beneficiary or to surrender the policy, it is no answer that some-
one other than the insured could prevent him from exercising this
non-Hohfeldian 47 power by a proceeding in law or equity.148 In a
contest between "policy facts" and "intent facts" the former will pre-
vail1 49 absent some evidence that the existence of certain policy facts
is attributable to the actions of someone other than the insured.
150
Ownership of life insurance and its effect on includability for
estate tax purposes is another instance in which local property
laws collide with federal tax laws.' 5 ' The problem warrants con-
sideration when insurance is used for business purposes, when one
with an insurable interest procures his own policy on the life of
another, and when an insured attempts to make a gift of a policy on
his own life. In situations involving a business use or a gift, the
stern attitude of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the courts
144 Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959).
145 Id. at 421; accord, Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829,
835-36 (6th Cir. 1965).
146 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1966).
147 For a discussion of Hohfeld's definitions of "right" and "power,"
see Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-32, 44-54 (1913).
148 355 F.2d at 11.
149 Osborn, Gifts of Life Insurance as an Element in Estate Planning,
N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1335, 1337 (1968).
150 Lamade v. Brownell, 245 F. Supp. 691, 695 (M.D. Pa. 1965) (reserva-
tion of right to change beneficiary included inadvertently when policies
were converted); National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 773,
775 (Ct. C1. 1950) (insurance salesman inserted unauthorized answers in ap-
plication).
151 For other examples see Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S.
456 (1967); Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade
II, 77 YALE L.J. 605, 612-17 (1968).
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is understandable. In both Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner'52 and
Hal v. Wheeler 53 there was evidence that the insured wanted to
make the policy available as an asset to his business but at the same
time retain the power to add the policy to his personal insurance if
the business need for such resources diminished. The Internal Rev-
enue Code is designed to discourage such attempts to evade the con-
sequences of one's acts. In the same way the incidents of ownership
test of section 2042 is aimed at the donor who would like to have his
beneficiary take life insurance death benefits free of estate tax lia-
bility, but would also like to be able to use the asset value of the
policy during his life (with or without the concurrence of the bene-
ficiary) in an emergency. These efforts at artfulness are usually mis-
guided and futile. The business man in a Piggott situation cannot
appropriate the policy for any purpose adverse to the interests of the
corporation. Local law relative to questions of ownership will pre-
vent it.' 4 All he has done is introduce "policy facts" producing ad-
verse estate tax consequences. The ability of the Commissioner
and the courts to spot imperfections in gifts is by now legendary. 55
The suspicion persists that inadvertence frequently contributes
to the unhappy tax result, particularly in those cases in which the
insured actually has no interest in the policy. Anyone with an insur-
able interest in the life of another may procure a policy on the life
of that person, 56 but as a practical matter, cooperation of the insured
is necessary. In most cases he will at least be required to submit to a
physical examination and sign the application. If, however, the under-
standing of all parties is that the policy is to belong to the beneficiary,
and if the beneficiary pays for it and keeps it, the beneficiary owns
all interests in it.157 Reservation of the right to change the bene-
ficiary by the nonowner insured gives him neither the right nor the
power to act against the interests of the beneficiary-owner.58 But
such a reservation is a "policy fact" that will make the death benefits
a part of the insured's estate.159
152 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965).
153 174 F. Supp. 418 (D. Me. 1959).
154 Armstrong Manors v. Burris, 193 Cal. App. 2d 447, 458, 14 Cal. Rptr.
338, 344-45 (1961); CAL. CORP. CODE § 820; N. LATTmN, THE LAW OF CoaPouRATioNs
511 (1959).
155 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F.2d 197
(2d Cir. 1956). See also Osborn, Gifts of Life Insurance as an Element in
Estate Planning, N.Y.U. 26TH INsT. ON FED. TAx. 1335, 1336-41 (1968).
156 E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10110; see Boyer v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 206 Cal. 273, 279, 274 P. 57, 60 (1929).
157 VAxcE, supra note 21, at 765-66.
158 See, e.g., Morrison v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 579, 103 P.2d
963 (1940); Ratsch v. Rengel, 180 Md. 196, 23 A.2d 680 (1942).
159 Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.
1966).
Not all local law, however, is disregarded for federal tax pur-
poses. Treasury Regulations defining incidents of ownership under
section 2042 include an admonition that as an additional step in the
search for such incidents, "regard must be given to the effect of the
State or other applicable law upon the terms of the policy."''10 As
the Piggott and Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company cases illus-
trate, this regulation does not compel the Commissioner to take ac-
count of rights and interests that may accrue by means of equitable
assignment or contract obligations. It does require that attention be
given to the disposition of interests made by state community prop-
erty principles, and in that respect it may constitute still one more
tax hurdle. Freedman v. United States'6 ' involved a policy in which
it was stipulated that all values, rights and privileges would belong
to the person designated as "owner" in an appropriate line in the policy.
The policy was on the life of Mrs. Freedman, and Mr. Freedman was
named as owner at the appropriate place. Conceding that the insured
retained no power to exercise incidents of ownership, the court never-
theless held that designation of the husband as owner on the policy
was not sufficient to amount to an inter vivos gift of the half-interest
in the policy which belonged to the wife by operation of Texas com-
munity property laws. One half of the death benefits were includible
in Mrs. Freedman's estate for estate tax purposes.6 2 In some re-
spects, therefore, the regulation directing that effect be given to




Like any other chose in action a life insurance policy is assignable
for value. It can be sold outright'" or transferred as collateral for
some other obligation. 165 Unlike an account receivable, a life policy
has both a present value (cash surrender) and a contingent future
value (death benefits), so the precise understanding and intention
of the parties to the assignment transaction is more difficult to
determine. This uncertainty is compounded by the manifest reluc-
tance of courts to award death benefits to anyone but dependents of
the insured.
-60 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (5) (1958).
161 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967).
162 Id. at 747.
163 But cf. Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967); Thurman,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Community Property Life Insurance, 9
ST w. L. REv. 239, 253-56 (1957).
104 Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149 (1911).
165 Davis v. Modern Indus. Bank, 279 N.Y. 405, 18 N.E.2d 639 (1939).
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If a transfer of a life policy for value constitutes an assignment,
it is a transfer of title and a transfer of the asset value of the policy.
A purchaser-assignee certainly can deal with the policy as his own,
e.g., hold it, surrender it or reassign it. The same should be true of
an assignee who takes the policy as collateral, 166 but one hesitates to
suggest that such an assignee has complete freedom of action. If the
assignor defaults on the principal obligation, the assignee should be
in a position to recoup by taking the cash surrender value of the
policy, and there is authority to that effect.16 7 The acceptability of
life insurance as collateral will diminish if such assets cannot be used
as such by those who hold them. On the other hand, it is predictable
that some courts are going to view with disfavor hasty action by a
creditor that destroys the contingent interest of a wife and children.
Prudence dictates that a creditor not surrender a policy assigned as
collateral without first giving the assignor every chance to redeem
it,168 even though carefully drafted policies make it explicit that any
assignment or pZedge of the policy is a full transfer of all rights under
the policy.169
A knowledgeable assignee may anticipate challenges to his right
to deal freely with an assigned policy by insisting that he be desig-
nated as the beneficiary. The beneficiary designation will probably
be accompanied by a promise that no further changes will be made
until the principal obligation is paid, or the creditor may be named as
primary beneficiary accompanied by a secondary beneficiary whose
106 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 133 So. 2d 463
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
167 See Maloney v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 609
(2d Cir. 1959); Greenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 167 F. Supp. 112
(D. Minn. 1958). For cases in which the power of the assignee to take the
cash surrender value was assumed, see Conlew v. Kaufman, 269 N.Y. 481, 199
N.E. 767 (1936); Albrent v. Spencer, 3 Wis. 2d 273, 88 N.W.2d 333 (1958).
168 As recently as 1938 the rights of a transferee of a life policy were
still subject to considerable doubt. One student commentator sternly advised
his readers that a pledged life insurance policy should never be surrendered
without at least giving notice of such intention to the insured. 48 YALE L.J.
315, 319 (1938).
109 For example, "The Owner may assign this policy.... An assign-
ment by the owner, so long as it remains in force, shall exclude any and all
rights of any other person referred to in this policy, except that if this policy
is assigned or pledged as collateral only, any equity remaining at the ma-
turity of this policy will accrue to the person or persons who, had there been
no assignment then outstanding, would have been entitled to the amount then
payable. Upon release of all outstanding assignments or upon reassignment
to the Owner, the respective rights of the several persons referred to in this
policy shall be as then stated in this policy." E. PATTERSON & W. YOUNG, CASES
AND MATERiALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE app. L(I), at 734 (4th ed. 1964)
(specimen Ordinary (Whole) Life Insurance Policy).
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rights become operative upon discharge of the principal obligation.170
This may solve one kind of problem, but it introduces others.
One who procures insurance on his own life may name anyone
he wishes as the beneficiary, and, by the same token, may make an
absolute assignment of a policy on his life to any assignee of his
choice.171 Courts, however, are reluctant to conclude that a debtor-
insured intended to favor a creditor over his dependents to the ex-
tent of giving the creditor the death benefits even though the debt
has been paid,172 or even giving him that portion of the death benefits
exceeding the debt.1 73 In cases in which a creditor is named the
beneficiary or is given an absolute assignment, courts are still dis-
posed to search the record for evidence of an "intention of the parties"
that a collateral undertaking is what they really had in mind.174
Cases apparently to the contrary usually stand on unmistakable indi-
cations that an unconditional commitment was intended,175 or are
situations in which there is doubt that the beneficiary or assignee was
a creditor in the first place. 7 6 Even the strongest contrary author-
ities appear to stand for no more than the narrow proposition that
the mere fact that one, is or may have been a creditor does not auto-
matically disqualify him from being an object of the insured's
bounty.177
Creditor-Procured Policies
A creditor may choose to protect himself by insuring the life of
his debtor on his own initiative. Even in this situation questions
arise as to the proper disposition of death benefits in excess of the
debt thus secured. Professor Vance preferred the position that the
debtor had no interest in the policy in this situation; that it was
exclusively the investment of the creditor, and as such the policy
benefits should belong to him.178 He acknowledged, however, that
170 For an example of such a clause see Ir re Estate of Goldstein, 384
Pa. 1, 119 A.2d 278 (1956).
171 This statement is, of course, subject to the exception that an as-
signment cannot be used as a mask for a deliberate wagering transaction by
one who does not have in insurable interest in the assignor's life. See VANcE,
supra note 21, at 768-71.
172 Amick v. Butler, 111 Ind. 578, 12 N.E. 518 (1887).
173 See Chapman v. Scott, 234 S.C. 469, 109 S.E.2d 1 (1959).
174 E.g., Boyle v. Crimm, 363 Mo. 731, 739, 253 S.W.2d 149, 155 (1952);
Chapman v. Scott, 234 S.C. 469, 109 S.E.2d 1 (1959).
175 E.g., Urquhart v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 218 Md. 405, 147 A.2d
213 (1958) (dictum); see Fitzgerald v. Rawlings, 114 Md. 470, 79 A. 915 (1911).
176 American Cas. Co. v. Rose, 340 F.2d 469 (1964); Rettenmaier v.
Rettenmaier, 255 Iowa 937, 124 N.W.2d 453 (1963).
177 Forster v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 135 Colo. 383, 311 P.2d 700 (1957);
Rettenmaier v. Rettenmaier, 255 Iowa 937, 124 N.W.2d 453 (1963).
178 VANCE, supra note 21, at 740.
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this was not the prevailing view, 7 9 and with the increased use of
credit life insurance it is unlikely to become more popular.18 0 The
pervasive public policy notion that it is improper for a creditor to
receive death benefits beyond the amount of the debt is reflected by
recent statutes enacted to regulate credit insurance. These statutes
consistently direct that credit policies must provide that any excess
over the unpaid indebtedness be paid either to a beneficiary other
than the creditor or the debtor's estate.' 8 '
In at least one state-Georgia-such a statute has effected a
change in the result reached in this type of case. In an action 1 82
decided prior to the enactment of the statute it was held that the
debtor-insured could not state a cause of action against a recalcitrant
insurer 183 because the creditor was possessed of all legal and beneficial
interest in the policy, even conceding that the debtor-insured had in
fact and effect paid the premiums. Subsequent to the enactment of
the statute, however, it was held that an administratrix of the estate
of a debtor-insured who had paid the debt from other assets of the
estate was entitled to reimbursement from the insurer.1 84 The policy,
it was said, insured the life of the debtor, not the debt. The promise
of the insurer was more than an assurance that the creditor would not
suffer loss by reason of the death of the debtor. 85
The entry of an assuming grantee into the typical creditor-pur-
chased insurance situation creates a most instructive illustration of
the treatment of these situations by the courts. In this situation the
debtor is insured by a life policy procured by the creditor-beneficiary.
The original debtor conveys the property that created this debtor-
creditor relationship to a grantee who assumes either a mortgage on
the realty18 or a conditional sales contract on the chattel' 87 so pur-
179 Id.
180 For an example of a court determined to see that a creditor does not
enjoy a double benefit see General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Kendrick,
270 Ala. 676, 115 So. 2d 487 (1959).
181 These acts adopt or follow closely the language of the Model Credit
Insurance Act proposed by the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3808 (1947); CAL. INs. CODE § 779.6 (Supp.
1968); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3306(2) (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-5606(B)
(1961); N.M. STAT. ANt. § 58-26-6(B) (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. ANv. tit. 40,
§ 1007.6(b) (Supp. 1961); TEx. INs. CODE art. 3.53 § 6(b) (1963).
182 Murray v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 107 Ga. App. 545, 130 S.E.2d
767 (1963).
183 The policy provided disability coverage that the company refused to
honor. This was an action to compel payment of disability allowances. Id.
at 546, 130 S.E.2d at 768.
184 Pioneer Homeowners Life Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 110 Ga. App. 887, 140
S.E.2d 212 (1965).
185 Id. at 888, 140 S.E.2d at 213.
186 Betts v. Brown, 219 Ga. 782, 136 S.E.2d 365 (1964).
187 Hatley v. Johnston, 265 N.C. 73, 143 S.E.2d 260 (1965).
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chased. Upon the death of the original debtor the insurer pays the
proceeds to the creditor-beneficiary even though the obligation of this
debtor has been assumed by the grantee. The recent decisions are
not numerous, but they have consistently held that the death benefits
of credit life policies belong, in the last analysis, to the estate or de-
pendents of the original debtor.188 The mechanism used is that of
subrogation of the representative of the debtor-insured to the cred-
itor's claim against the assuming grantee. Several propositions
emerge from these decisions. First, the cases adopt the position that
the policy insures the life of the debtor and not the debt. The insurer
must pay even if the debt has been paid. 8 9 Secondly, if anyone is
going to enjoy a windfall, the preference is for the dependents of the
debtor-insured. 90 A windfall to the creditor is contrary to the policy
limiting creditors to indemnification,' 9' and a windfall to the assum-
ing grantee results in giving benefits to one who does not even have
an insurable interest in the life of the debtor. 92  Finally, there is
open recognition that the debtor indirectly pays for the credit life
insurance. 193 The statutes concerning credit life insurance recognize
this explicitly.9 4 There is, then, little reason for pursuing distinc-
tions based on insurance procured by a debtor for his creditor's bene-
fit as opposed to insurance procured by the creditor for his own
benefit.
188 Betts v. Brown, 219 Ga. 782, 136 S.E.2d 365 (1964); Hatley v. John-
ston, 265 N.C. 73, 143 S.E.2d 260 (1965); Kincaid v. Alderson, 209 Tenn. 597,
354 S.W.2d 775 (1962).
189 See, e.g., Betts v. Brown, 219 Ga. 782, 136 S.E.2d 365 (1964); Kincaid
v. Alderson, 209 Tenn. 597, 354 S.W.2d 775 (1962).
190 See Tighe v. Walton, 233 Miss. 781, 103 So. 2d 8 (1958).
191 Hatley v. Johnston, 265 N.C. 73, 143 S.E.2d 260 (1965). A student
note suggested that in light of the Hatley decision the North Carolina Court
should reconsider the position taken in Miller v. Potter, 210 N.C. 268, 186 S.E.
350 (1936), disallowing subrogation in a situation where the creditor procured
the policy. 45 N.C.L. REV. 270 (1966).
192 Hatley v. Johnston, 265 N.C. 73, 143 S.E.2d 260 (1965); Kincaid v.
Alderson, 209 Tenn. 597, 354 S.W.2d 775 (1962).
193 See, e.g., Betts v. Brown, 219 Ga. 782, 136 S.E.2d 365 (1964); Hatley
v. Johnston, 265 N.C. 73, 143 S.E.2d 260 (1965).
194 The Model Credit Insurance Act of the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners includes a provision stipulating that when insurance
is required in any credit transaction, the debtor shall have the option of pro-
viding such insurance through existing policies owned or controlled by him or
through insurance he procures from or through someone other than the credi-
tor. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 66-3814 (1947); CAL. INs. CODE § 770.20 (Supp. 1968);
GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3311 (1960); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-5611 (1961); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 58-26-11 (Supp. 1967); PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 40, § 1007.11 (Supp. 1961);
TEx. INs. CODE art. 3.53, § 11 (1963).
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Intent of the Insured-Subrogation
Even in those cases in which the beneficiary designation or assign-
ment makes it perfectly clear that the insurance policy is serving as
collateral for a principal debt and that any balance remaining after
payment of the debt is to be paid to a secondary beneficiary, there may
still be questions as to the ultimate disposition of the death benefits
of the policy. If the policy is intended merely to secure payment of
the debt, the debt remains an obligation of the insured's estate, and
the secondary beneficiary can be subrogated to the creditor's claim
against the estate if the policy benefits are used to pay the debt. 195 If
the policy is intended to stand as the primary source from which the
debt is to be paid, however, the secondary beneficiary is entitled only
to the balance remaining after the debt is paid out of the policy
benefits. 19 Here, as with similar problems, the popular rubric is that
the intention of the insured controls.197 In some respects that inten-
tion is determined more mechanically in these situations than in many
others, 1 8 but the decisions are still influenced by the way particular
courts feel about life policies, the interests therein and the contending
parties.
At one extreme is the approach of the Maryland court in Blair
v. Baker,19 in which the beneficiary was regarded as the owner of the
life policy, subject to reserved powers of the insured to destroy that
ownership interest.200 By this rule an assignment of the policy as
collateral is merely an encumbrance on the policy, not an extinguish-
ment pro tanto of the beneficiary's interest.20' Courts of this dispo-
195 See, e.g., Walzer v. Walzer, 3 N.Y.2d 8, 143 N.E.2d 361, 163 N.Y.S.2d
632 (1957); In re Scheer's Will, 1 Misc. 2d 899, 11 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1952),
affd, 281 App. Div. 808, 118 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1953).
196 See, e.g., In re Estate of Cohen, 23 Il. App. 2d 411, 418-19, 163
N.E.2d 533, 537 (1959); In re Kelley's Estate, 251 App. Div. 847, 296 N.Y.S. 923
(1937); In re Estate of Kelekian, 1 Misc. 2d 886, 152 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Sup. Ct.
1952).
197 See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Illinois Nat'l Bank, 34 F. Supp. 206
(E.D. Mich. 1940); Seitz v. Seitz, 238 Miss. 296, 118 So. 2d 351 (1960); In re
Miller's Estate, 402 Pa. 140, 166 A.2d 10 (1960). See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.
2d 496 (1963).
198 See, e.g., In re Estate of Cohen, 23 IM. App. 2d 411, 163 N.E.2d 533
(1959); Walzer v. Walzer, 3 N.Y.2d 8, 143 N.E.2d 361, 163 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1957);
In re Kelly's Estate, 251 App. Div. 847, 296 N.Y.S. 923 (1937); In re Scheer's
Will, 1 Misc. 2d 899, 114 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1952), affd, 281 App. Div. 808,
118 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1953); In re Estate of Kelekian, 1 Misc. 2d 886, 152 N.Y.S.2d
205 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
199 196 Md. 242, 76 A.2d 129 (1950).
200 In this connection it must be noted that Maryland is not a minority
rule state with reference to the nature of a beneficiary's interest. The bene-
ficiary has only an "expectancy." Durst v. Durst, 232 Md. 311, 315, 193 A.2d
26, 28 (1962).
201 Blair v. Baker, 196 Md. 242, 76 A.2d 129 (1950).
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sition may put the burden on the estate to prove that the insured did
not intend the beneficiary to be subrogated to the creditor's claim." 2
At the other end of the scale is the position of the Georgia court in
Ruis v. Bank of Albany,20 3 in which the beneficiary was treated as
holding only a divestible interest which an assignment divests. The
beneficiary has no standing to complain if the creditor satisfies his
claim out of the proceeds of the policy rather than by resorting to
other collateral, and a fortiori he is not subrogated to the creditor's
claim.
20 4
The New York courts purport to start with a general rule that
the life policy is deemed not to be the primary source of payment
when it is assigned as collateral security,20 5 but they also look for
certain indications of a particular intent on the part of the insured.20 6
Apparently the clearest sign of an intention that the beneficiary is to
take only the balance remaining after the debt is paid is a formal
change of beneficiary accompanying the assignment in which the
same beneficiary is renamed, but a stipulation is added that his rights
are to be subject to the rights of the assignee.20 7 The same intent was
found in one case in which a new beneficiary was named simultane-
ously with the execution of the assignment.20 8  But when the in-
sured changed the beneficiary from his own estate to his daughters
eight years after the assignment, the court of appeals concluded
there was no evidence that the insured intended his daughters
to take only the excess over that needed to satisfy the debt.20 9 In
the latter two cases the change of beneficiary stipulated, at the
assignee's insistence, that the new beneficiaries took their interests
subject to the rights of the assignee.
210
The Pennsylvania court has determined the intent of the insured
in this context with considerable freedom. In one case weight was
202 See In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953).
203 213 Ga. 41, 96 S.E.2d 580 (1957).
204 Parramore v. Williams, 215 Ga. 179, 109 S.E.2d 745 (1959).
205 Walzer v. Walzer, 3 N.Y.2d 8, 143 N.E.2d 361, 163 N.Y.S.2d 632
(1957).
206 Id.
207 In re Kelly's Estate, 251 App. Div. 847, 296 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1937); see
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Phillips, 5 N.J. Super. 529, 68 A.2d 574 (Ch. 1949),
aff'd, 4 N.J. 28, 71 A.2d 352 (1950).
208 In re Estate of Kelekian, 1 Misc. 2d 886, 152 N.Y.S.2d 205 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
209 Walzer v. Walzer, 3 N.Y.2d 8, 143 N.E.2d 361, 163 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1957).
The court was careful to state that it considered this situation distinguishable
from the cases cited in notes 207 and 208 supra and that it was taking noth-
ing from the rule of those decisions.
210 Walzer v. Walzer, 3 N.Y.2d 8, 11, 143 N.E.2d 361, 362, 163 N.Y.S.2d
632, 633-34 (1957); In re Estate of Kelekian, 1 Misc. 2d 886, 152 N.Y.S.2d 205
(Sup. Ct. 1952).
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given to the language of the standard assignment clause in the pol-
icy.211 In another case, and one in which the beneficiary's cause was
more appealing, this boilerplate was less weighty.212 Here a widow-
beneficiary who had invested her own funds in the project for which
the loan was made (secured by the policy assignment), established her
right to undiminished death benefits on inconclusive circumstantial
evidence.213  Yet, in a third case, a grandson with no demonstrated
special claim was required to establish affirmatively that the insured
intended that he be subrogated to the creditor's claim.
214
The results in some of these cases leave doubts that the intention
of the insured has been read accurately. In Blair v. Baker,215 twenty
pecuniary legacies in the insured's will went unsatisfied upon the
determination that assigned policies payable to the insured's estate
had to be fully applied to the debt before anything could be taken
from the assigned policy payable to an individual beneficiary.216
On the other hand, six policies, all payable to individual beneficiaries,
were assigned as collateral for the same debt in In re Scheer's Will,
217
but the one policy in which the beneficiary had been changed simul-
taneously with the execution of the assignment 218 was held fully
subject to payment of the debt with no right of subrogation against
the estate. If any balance of the debt remained unpaid, it was to be
apportioned among the other five policies with the right of subro-
gation to those beneficiaries. 2 9 These cases illustrate that it is impor-
tant for all relevant documents to speak clearly if the insured's in-
tention is not to be subverted. Since his intention in this regard is
not fixed at any particular time, attention must be given to his will
as well as to the assignment and the policy to make certain that all
are clear and consistent.
220
Conflicts in Interests through Dishonesty
Easy transfers of interests of interest in life policies raise a small
211 In re Estate of Goldstein, 384 Pa. 1, 119 A.2d 278 (1956). The clause
was very close to the one quoted in note 169 supra.
212 In re Cribbs, 411 Pa. 242, 191 A.2d 379 (1963).
213 Id. at 247, 191 A.2d at 381.
214 In re Estate of Green, 415 Pa. 161, 202 A.2d 17 (1964).
215 196 Md. 242, 76 A.2d 129 (1950).
216 This beneficiary was not a relative or a "natural" object of the
insured's bounty. In re Estate of Green, 415 Pa. 161, 162, 202 A.2d 17 (1964).
217 1 Misc. 2d 899, 114 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1952), aff'd, 281 App. Div.
808, 118 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1953).
218 This change of beneficiary is usually made at the creditor's in-
sistence and for that reason alone is questionable evidence of the insured's
intent. Moreover, it is probably unnecessary to the creditor's protection.
219 In re Scheer's Will, 1 Misc. 2d 899, 903, 114 N.Y.S.2d 288, 292 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
220 See, e.g., In re Estate of Green, 415 Pa. 161, 163, 202 A.2d 17, 19 (1964).
but nagging doubt whether purchasers for value of such interests
are sufficiently protected in all situations. If a dishonest insured
transfers interests for value to more than one person, the usual rules
governing priorities among successive assignees of the same chose in
action presumably will come into operation.2 21  Courts may deviate
from these rules, however, when one of the competing interests is
either a wife-donee of a parol inter vivos gift or an ex-wife who has
acquired her interest by means of a separation agreement.
It is almost uniformly true that assignments of life policies can
be made without any endorsement on the policy itself.222 Most in-
surers require that they be furnished with two copies of any assign-
ment and stipulate that they will not be bound until such documents
are received and filed.2 2 3 It is consistently held that these provisions
are for the exclusive protection of the insurer and do not affect rights
between competing claimants.224 Thus a promise in a property settle-
ment agreement can make the wife an irrevocable beneficiary while
the policy remains in the possession of the husband. In Shoudy v.
Shoudy2 5 the court intimated it might consider whether one who
had given value for an interest in a policy previously transferred by
property settlement agreement had a "superior equity," but found that
no such situation was presented in the case before it. Similarly, in
Campbell v. Prudential Insurance Company of America226 the court
suggested that in an appropriate case it might consider whether the
actions of the true owner of a policy had misled the other claimant or
contributed to his injury.227 In Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Com-
221 See, e.g., Wishnick v. Preserves & Honey, Inc., 272 N.Y. 252, 5 N.E.2d
808 (1935); 4 A. CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 915 (1951, Supp. 1964).
222 E.g., Herman v. Connecticut, 218 Mass. 181, 105 N.E. 450 (1914);
Klebba v. Struempf, 224 Mo. App. 193, 23 S.W.2d 205 (1930).
223 Elledge v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 241 Ark. 106, 406 S.W.2d 374 (1966).
The typical policy clause is quoted in Asphalt Paving Inc. v. Iflery, 149 So. 2d
370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963): "No assignment of this policy shall be binding
upon the Company unless filed in duplicate at the Home office, one [copy] to
be retained by the Company and the other to be returned to the Insured.
The Company assumes no responsibility for the validity of any assignment."
Id. at 378.
224 See, e.g., Munn v. Robison, 203 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1953); Hamilton v.
Hamilton, 255 Ala. 284, 290, 51 So. 2d 13, 18 (1950) (dictum); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Bourne
v. Haynes, 235 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
225 55 Cal. App. 344, 203 P. 433 (1921).
226 73 Ohio L. Abs. 262, 137 N.E.2d 515 (Ct. App. 1955).
227 This possibility has existed at least since the leading case of Her-
man v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 218 Mass. 181, 105 N.E. 450 (1914). This
sturdy precedent was undoubtedly part of the support used for the Restate-
ment by the American Law Institute. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 173
(b) (iv) (1932). See also Cadore v. Cadore, 67 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1953).
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pany v. City National Bank,228 the husband assigned a policy to his
wife to secure support payments to be made under a separation
agreement. The wife gave notice of the assignment to the insurer,
but did not furnish copies of the assignment. The court held she
had a right superior to that of a subsequent assignee for value be-
cause her assignment was prior in time and also because she had
given prior notice. The court also held she was not estopped on the
facts to assert her claim, though she was in part responsible for the
fact that her husband still had possession of the policy with no en-
dorsements or attachments indicating the presence of the prior assign-
ment.
2 2 9
The bothersome cases are those in which the courts disregard
the "superior equity" problem (or perhaps do not have it called to
their attention). In Munn v. Robison, 230 the creditor-claimant pro-
duced a contract signed by the insured stating that the policy had
been assigned to him to secure the obligation contained therein. The
court, with no explanation, said this was not an assignment, and
added that in any event it was immaterial since the insured had
previously divested himself of title by a parol inter vivos gift of the
policy to his wife.231 The fact that conflicts of interest produced by
dishonesty are exceptional is not a great comfort. The conflict in the
Munn case was probably the result of ignorance, and ignorance in
these affairs is rather common.
Group Life Insurance
Group life insurance presents many of the same problems as
does ordinary life insurance but in an exaggerated form. This insur-
ance involves an employer, union or some other intermediary as the
policyholder. 232 The promise of the insurer is to pay benefits at the
direction of various individuals who participate in this master policy
held by the institutional insured. For a number of reasons both in-
228 95 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.W. Va. 1950).
229 The second assignee apparently had actual notice of the prior as-
signment and first assignee had made some effort to get possession of the
policy. Id. at 278-81.
230 203 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1953).
231 Id. at 781. In Borchert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 N.Y.S.2d 529
(Sup. Ct. 1948), the court stated that if the insured procured possession of the
policy "fraudulently" (by representing that he wanted to get a policy loan),
he could transfer "no better title even to a bona fide purchaser for value with-
out notice than any possessor of goods without title." Id. at 532 (emphasis
added).
232 Employee group life plans represent 85.8 percent of the total. IN-
STITUTE OF LIFE INSURMCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT Boox 30 (1968). Accordingly
this discussion will focus on problems presented by this most common ar-
rangement.
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surer and insured may wish to limit the manner in which individuals
can participate, and it is common for such policies to contain limi-
tations on the disposition of benefits, most particularly a prohibition
of assignment.
Prohibition of Assignment
It is again necessary to begin with generalities. Obligations that
have matured are assignable just as any other claim for money.2 33
Contingent interests are choses in action and are assignable unless
such assignment is prohibited by law or by contract.234  Statutory
prohibitions of assignment of interests in life policies are effective,23 5
but there is some question of the enforceability of similar restrictions
originating in insurance contracts.
Bimestefer v. Bimestefer23 is a leading example of the strict
position. That is, if the policy contains an absolute prohibition of
assignments, an attempt to assign it is ineffective.237 The insurer is
not privileged to waive the provision because his are not the only
interests involved. The employer-policyholder also has an interest.
Group life insurance is one of the advantages the employer offers to
induce employees to continue in his employ, an inducement that will
be lost if the employee conveys away all his interest in the policy.
238
An employer, and perhaps the insurer as well, additionally has an
interest in seeing that the employee does not transfer his interest in
his group policy indiscriminately. In most cases that danger is slight,
as group insurance is generally term insurance with no loan or cash
surrender value.
Bimestefer was not such a case. The contending parties were a
son claiming as donee of an inter vivos gift and a second wife-bene-
ficiary. Under the strict position, then, parol inter vivos gifts and
equitable assignments by way of property settlement agreements,
business purchase arrangements or collateral assignments are of no
effect. The only method of making an effective transfer of an in-
terest in a group life policy under this position is by a change of
beneficiary in strict conformity with policy procedures.
233 VANCE, supra note 21, at 762-63.
234 See, e.g., Bimestefer v. Bimestefer, 205 Md. 541, 109 A.2d 768 (1954).
See generally Senese v. Senese, 121 N.Y.S.2d 498, 503 (Sup. Ct. 1953) (dictum).
235 War Veteran's Relief Act, 38 U.S.C. § 718 (1964) (prohibition of as-
signment of federal government insurance), construed in Kauffman v. Kauff-
man, 93 Cal. App. 2d 808, 210 P.2d 29 (1949). See also Tompkins v. Tompkins,
132 N.J.L. 217, 38 A.2d 890 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
236 205 Md. 541, 109 A.2d 768 (1954).
237 The court relied on Allhusen v. Caristo Constr. Corp., 303 N.Y. 446,
103 N.E.2d 891 (1952).
238 Bimestefer v. Bimestefer, 205 Md. 541, 547, 109 A.2d 768, 771 (1954);
see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 222 Ky. 211, 213-14, 300 S.W. 599, 600
(1927). See also Daino v. Atlantic Refining Co., 399 Pa. 606, 161 A.2d 42 (1960).
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There is authority contrary to this strict position, but the reasons
for these decisions are varied. One case suggested that an equitable
assignment arising out of a separation agreement is analogous to a
change of beneficiary and as such does not contravene a prohibition
of assignments.239 Others are content to leave the power to waive
with the insurer.240 Finally, some courts have long taken the position
that an insurer does not have unrestricted power to dictate to an
insured what he may or may not do with his policy,241 and justify
their decisions on this basis.
The matter deserves careful thought. Group life is no longer
exclusively poor man's insurance available in minimal amounts,
242
and the absence of loan or cash surrender value does not necessarily
make a life policy unmarketable as collateral. As a number of cases
illustrate, term insurance is acceptable security for a variety of obli-
gations.243  Group life policies represent the principal or only sub-
stantial assets of many persons. Allowing employer and insurer to
prevent an insured from making use of his group policy as he desires
runs against the developing hostility to contractual restraints on
assignments generally.244- The middle-aged gentleman who wishes to
use his group policy as collateral for the purchase of a retirement
condominium in Orange County or Fort Lauderdale is likely to resent
an agreement between his employer and group insurer that he cannot
use it for such a purpose, particularly if the policy is one in which he
239 Kelly v. Layton, 309 F.2d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
240 See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d
340 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Bourne v. Haynes, 235 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
241 E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 457, 47
A.2d 340, 344 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946) (group life); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Grant,
54 N.J. Eq. 208, 217, 33 A. 1060, 1063 (Ch. 1896) (ordinary life); cf. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Poliakoff, 123 N.J. Eq. 524, 528, 198 A. 852, 853 (Ch. 1938).
See also Hasselberger v. Hasselberger, 102 N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
242 Most state statutes authorizing issuance of group policies place
limits on the amount of group life issuable to any one person. These ceilings
have been increasing. See, e.g., CAL. INs. CODE § 10202.8(d) (increasing the
limit from $20,000 to $50,000); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 425 (1957) (a maxi-
mum as high as $100,000; an increase from $40,000).
243 E.g., Kelly v. Layton, 309 F.2d 611 (8th Cir. 1962) (secure support
payments); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 133 So. 2d 463
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (bank loan); Urquhart v. Alexander & Alexander,
Inc., 218 Md. 405, 147 A.2d 213 (1958) (loan from employer).
244 See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-318(4), where it is stipu-
lated that prohibitions of assignment of accounts or contract rights shall be
ineffective. The Commissioners note laconically that this move will be re-
gretted only by those who "cherish the hope that we may yet return to the
views entertained some two hundred years ago by the Court of King's Bench."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-318(4), Official Comment. This section, of
course, does not apply to transfers of interests in insurance policies. UNIFORm
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-104(g).
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has contributed to payment of the premiums. As already noted,245
recent statutes regulating credit insurance consistently reserve to
borrowers the option to use insurance already in existence as an alter-
native to buying a new policy offered by lenders. This option is not
particularly valuable to the borrower whose existing insurance con-
sists of group policies containing enforceable nonassignmnent clauses.
A countervailing consideration is the fact that group life, even
more than ordinary life, is regarded as "dependents" insurance. Both
the form of beneficiary clause frequently used 246 and the prohibition
of assignments are calculated to prevent dissipation of the bene-
ficiaries' death benefits. Commentators, concerned about the tax
effects of the assignability or nonassignability of group policies, fre-
quently assume that someone must serve as a check on the insured
in the disposition of these assets.247 This concern is a natural one.
The amount of coverage provided by most group policies is still
relatively small,248 and an assignment of a term policy is necessarily
a transfer of an interest in death benefits. Arguably, society does
have an interest in preventing wage earners from using their group
life policies-often their only substantial assets-as credit insurance.
Enforcement of contract provisions is a simpler and less abrasive
way of effecting this policy than direct regulation would be. How-
ever, just as some courts have objected to giving insurance com-
panies the power to decide between competing claimants by electing
to waive or not waive policy requirements on change of beneficiary
and assignments generally,249 it is faintly unsettling to give insurers
and employers uncontrolled discretion to decide which employees are
sufficiently responsible to make assignments of their group policies.
The Effect of Pension Plans
There are distinct similarities between group life insurance and
245 See note 194 and accompanying text supra.
246 The beneficiary clauses of many group policies stipulate that in
the absence of a specifically designated beneficiary the death benefits shall
go, in order, to spouse, children, parents, brothers and sisters, etc. Only if
none of these persons are available will the benefits go to the insured's estate
where it can be reached by his creditors. Such clauses are illustrated in
many cases. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 94 Cal. App. 2d 785, 211 P.2d 357
(1949); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A.2d 340 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1946).
247 See, e.g., Seeley & Locke, Estate Planning with Employee Group
Term Life Insurance, 52 A.B.A.J. 485, 486 n.15 (1966); Comment, Exclusion of
Group Life Proceeds from Insured's Gross Estate for Estate Tax Purposes,
34 FoDEHAm L. REv. 269, 274 n.41 (1965).
248 Average employee coverage at the end of 1967 was $6,780. INsr
oF LIFE IxsuRAwcE, LIFE INSURAN E FACT BOOK 30 (1968).
249 E.g., Goodrich v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 111 Neb. 616, 197
N.W. 380 (1924). See also Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 5, 26-28 (1951).
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pension plans, and as far as transferability of interests is concerned,
some cross-fertilization can be expected. The most direct comparison
is with the death benefit provisions common to contributory pension
plans under which an employee's contribution is payable to a bene-
ficiary if the employee dies before becoming eligible for retirement.
When the question was presented in Sullivan v. Union Oil Com-
pany,250 the California court looked to insurance cases for author-
ity 251 and has thereafter looked to Sullivan in insurance cases.252
In cases253 like Sullivan, in which the question is whether a bene-
ficiary has renounced his interest through a property settlement
agreement, the parallels are almost exact. The beneficiary has only
an expectancy, and the employee has unrestricted power to change
the beneficiary. The tendency to follow guides established by insur-
ance decisions is understandable and seems sound.254 In other situ-
ations insurance principles do not fit quite so neatly, and in one case
the California Supreme Court expressly disapproved uncritical ad-
herence to insurance precedents when dealing with pension plans es-
tablished by statute for public employees.
255
The question for the future is a political one. As things presently
stand, courts and legislatures take a very protective attitude toward
benefits payable under pension plans. Statutes creating public pen-
sion plans commonly provide the same shelter from the claims of cred-
itors as has been long provided for benefits payable under life insur-
ance policies.256 In addition, restrictions on the transfer or assign-
ment of rights under public pension plans are usually absolute or at
least very stringent.257 Starting with this express protective policy
on public pensions, courts move easily to enforcement of provisions
in private pension and annuity plans with the same objective in mind.
250 16 Cal. 2d 229, 105 P.2d 922 (1940).
251 Id. at 234-35, 105 P.2d at 925.
252 See, e.g., Thorp v. Randazzo, 41 Cal. 2d 770, 264 P.2d 38 (1953); cf.
Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841 (1945).
253 See, e.g., Shaw v. Board of Administration, 109 Cal. App. 2d 770,
241 P.2d 635 (1952).
254 See, e.g., First W. Bank & Trust Co. v. Omizzolo, 176 Cal. App. 2d
555, 1 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1959); Shaw v. Board of Administration, 109 Cal. App.
2d 770, 241 P.2d 635 (1952).
255 Watenpaugh v. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 51 Cal. 2d 675,
681-82, 336 P.2d 165, 169 (1959).
256 E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 690.22; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 21201; MD.
ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 17 (1957); Ttx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANw. art. 6228a, § 9
(state and county employees) (1962); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6243 (city
employees) (1962).
257 E.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 21201; AM. ANN. CODE art. 73B, § 17 (1957);
Tzx. REV. Civ. STAT. Azw. art. 6228a, § 9 (state and county employees) (1962);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6243 (city employees) (1962).
In Thomas v. Thomas,258 it was held that payments due under a
private pension plan were not subject to garnishment to satisfy ar-
rearages in support payments to an ex-wife (or for any other purpose).
The employer-employee contract provided that benefits payable under
the plan "shall be nonassignable whether by voluntary or involun-
tary assignment or by operation of law .. ,,259 The plan under
examination was privately financed by the employer, but the court
assumed that if it had been funded by insurance, individual benefits
would be immune from process under a statute providing such shelter
for the proceeds of group insurance policies. 260 Relying on public
pension statutes, principles supporting spendthrift trusts, and cases
like Bimestefer v. Bimestefer261 which sustain nonassignment clauses
in group policies generally, the court found ample evidence that there
was no public policy precluding enforcement of private prohibi-
tions of "voluntary or involuntary" assignment..
2 62
The only thing the Thomas and Bimestefer cases have in common
is that in both instances the court was looking at a fund specifically
designed for the benefit and protection of individuals whose power to
sustain themselves had been reduced through retirement. If a pen-
sioner is to be protected from his general creditors for the public
good, it would be inconsistent to permit him to avoid that protection
and favor one creditor by the simple device of making an assignment.
Essentially this is also the underlying rationale of exemption statutes
protecting beneficiaries of life insurance. A blanket prohibition of
assignments of life policies is impossible under modern conditions,
but the inclination to place group policy benefits under the same
protective umbrella as pension benefits is clearly present.
2 3
Assignment Provisions and Estate Planning
There is a small irony in the fact that refusal to allow manipu-
lation of assignment provisions may complicate the use of group life
insurance as an estate planning "tool." For the well heeled, group
term insurance is a convenient and low-cost method of providing
258 192 Cal. App. 2d 771, 13 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1961).
259 Id. at 775, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75.
260 CAL. INs. CODE § 10213. See also Hoffman v. Hoffman, 8 N.J. 157,
84 A.2d 441 (1951), relied on in Thomas v. Thomas, 192 Cal. App. 2d 771,
781-82, 13 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878-79 (1961).
261 205 Md. 541, 109 A.2d 768 (1954).
262 192 Cal. App. 2d at 782-83, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
263 CAL. INS. CODE § 10130 provides in broad terms that life insurance
policies shall be transferable. There is dictum to the effect that contract
prohibitions cannot frustrate this statutory policy. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook,
17 Cal. 2d 639, 645, 111 P.2d 322, 329 (1941). Group policies are, however,
specifically excluded from the operation of section 10130. CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10129.
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heirs with a substantial amount of ready cash, and if the insured can
divest himself of all incidents of ownership in the policy by an abso-
lute assignment, the death benefits will not be included in his gross
estate for tax purposes.26 4 But how does one make an absolute assign-
ment of a policy which by its terms is nonassignable? It is at this
point that tax commentators urge a double standard of sorts: Non-
assignment clauses to protect the dependents of wage earners coupled
with a power in the employer and insurer to waive the restriction for
high salaried executives. 2 5 To the uninitiated there is something in-
comprehensible about a system under which, in theory at least, a
private employer and a private insurer may decide who will pay an
estate tax on his group insurance and who will not. In addition, since
the sole function of group term insurance is to provide a sum of
money for the dependents (or estate) 266 of the insured, the reported
hostile mutterings in the Internal Revenue Service about manipu-
lation of group life insurance policies are understandable. 267 Transfer
to the named beneficiary (or other natural object of the insured's
bounty) of a policy having no asset value can be said to be no transfer
at all.
At present the matter is subject to considerable speculation and
very little authority. Assignability, it is said, is determined by state
law and the terms of the contract. 268 The fifth circuit has applied
this principle,269 but other segments of the federal judiciary have
either denied state law the power to affect application of the federal
tax acts significantly 270 or have ignored it. 2 7 1 Even assuming that an
assignment blessed by employer and insurer is a sufficient transfer
of ownership generally, there are some incidents of ownership that
are difficult to shake off. For example, most group policies carry
a conversion privilege under which an employee who is discharged
or whose master policy is cancelled is entitled to convert to individual
(non-term) coverage within a certain period, without proof of insur-
ability. The statutes of 39 states now require group policies to in-
264 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042.
265 See authorities cited and text accompanying note 247 supra.
266 Policies payable to the estate of the insured are, of course, in-
cludible in the estate for tax purposes. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042(1).
267 Seeley & Locke, Estate Planning with Employee Group Term Life
Insurance, 52 A.B.A.J. 485, 485 n.7 (1966).
268 Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
269 First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 358 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1966); ac-
cord, Kidd v. Patterson, 230 F. Supp. 769, 772 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
270 See VANCE, supra note 21, at 79-81.
271 Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1965);
cf. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965). What the effect of
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), ultimately may be is al-
most impossible to predict at this juncture.
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clude this option,272 but it is unclear whether the insured can divest
himself of the privilege or transfer it to another. Also, employee-
insureds may always terminate group coverage by quitting the job
under which they are covered or by declining to pay premiums
if the insurance arrangement is contributory. There is borderline
authority for the proposition that this power to terminate is an
incident of ownership,2 73 and it seems unlikely that an assignee
can claim that he has received by transfer a right to keep the policy
in force by paying the premium as a nonemployee individual.274 The
Internal Revenue Service is not without weapons if it decides to
attack assignments to named beneficiaries of group term policies as a
means of avoiding the estate tax.
2 75
Conclusion
One cannot claim that a major problem has been created by exist-
ing inconsistencies in principles governing transfers of interests in
life insurance policies. In comparison to the large number of insur-
ance contracts in force, the incidence of disputes is still relatively
small. Professional fastidiousness is offended by imprecision, but
professional sensibilities are probably not reason enough to propose
extensive reforms. The fact remains, however, that life insurance
272 CCH FED. EsT. & GIFT TAx RE'. f 1670.051-.052 (1968).
273 Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 292-93 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950) (power to sell stock exchange seat was power
to terminate interest in group plan).
274 Comment, Exclusion of Group Life Insurance Proceeds from Insured's
Gross Estate for Estate Tax Purposes, 34 Fona.av L. REV. 269, 277-79 (1965).
275 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035, which illustrates that transfers
of life insurance in contemplation of death presents peculiarly difficult prob-
lems where group term life insurance is concerned. If the insured assignor
lives for more than three years after the transfer, there is little danger that
the total death benefits will be included in his gross estate. If he dies within
the critical three year period, there is probably little chance of establishing a
"life motive" for the transfer of ownership in a policy having no asset value.
It is even difficult to argue that the transfer was made to relieve him of the
temptation to encumber the policy, since he usually has no clear right to en-
cumber a "nonassignable" policy in the first place. The matter has not been
eased by the ruling of the Commissioner that when such a transfer is made
by a husband to his wife and the husband thereafter pays the premiums, that
proportion of the death benefits purchased with premiums paid in the last
three years of the transferor's life is an interest transferred in contemplation
of death and includible in his gross estate. Rev. Rul. 67-463, 1967-2 Cum.
BULL. 327; see 46 N.C.L. REv. 989 (1968). What the effect of this ruling may
be on transfers of group term policies is an interesting speculation. In one
sense each premium pays for the total amount of death benefits, since there
is no accumulation of reserve as in ordinary life policies. Arguably, under
this ruling the total death benefits of group term policies are always includible
and the days of group life insurance as an estate planning tool are over.
1216 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 20
May 1969] INTERESTS IN LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 1217
in all its forms represents an enormous accumulation of assets, and
is a method of investment employed by a growing number of families.
The sheer weight of the total investment, coupled with the fact that
larger numbers of individuals are choosing insurance as their prin-
cipal method of saving, must ultimately produce questions and chal-
lenges.
There are those who argue, for example, that dependents of dece-
dents who invest in life insurance are no more deserving of protection
from creditors than dependents of decedents who choose to invest in
securities, works of art, or real estate.276 Yet this is the effect of
many state exemption statutes. 277 Even the Internal Revenue Code
in its provisions prescribing the reach of federal tax liens makes an
effort to accommodate itself to state law with uneven and generally
unsatisfactory results.278  The application of exemption statutes is
particularly painful to those who believe these enactments owe their
existence as much to the legislative muscle of insurance companies
as to a concern for widows and orphans.
2 7 9
Part of the difficulty comes from the nature of the entity. A life
policy, in different circumstances, can be assigned legal characteristics
of everything from a bearer bond to a right of dower, and the influ-
ences working in any given case range from the apparent needs of
particular parties to the broadest notions of public policy. The day
may indeed be approaching when the allocation of interests in life
policies can no longer be made simply by reference to sweeping con-
cepts of freedom of contract, free alienability of choses in action and
the claims of dependents upon the public interest. The proper order-
ing of priorities of interests in life policies may require a more rigorous
differentiation between death benefits (and the rights of those who
are to receive them) and lifetime benefits (and the rights of those
with whom the insured deals as the owner of an asset). Correspond-
ingly, it may be necessary to identify and characterize transfers
according to their nature rather than the form they take. If a parol
inter vivos gift or an equitable assignment by means of contract is a
transfer of the right to receive death benefits, it is in the nature of a
change of beneficiary and perhaps should be treated accordingly.
Such transfers are "assignments" only in the most conceptual terms.
Considerable work also needs to be done on nomenclature, par-
ticularly as used in statutes. The excessively general language of an
270 See Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies, 4 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 583, 617 (1956).
277 E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 690.19.
278 Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade 11,
77 YALE L.J. 605, 612-17 (1968).
270 Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United
States, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 583, 585, 595 (1957).
earlier and simpler time may now be meaningless or actually inac-
curate,28 0 and statutes using broad, simple terms to deal with in-
creasingly involved contracts can produce some unexpected results. 281
Terms like "proceeds and avails" have a nice 18th century ring to
them, but frequently fail to do the job.2 82 In the final analysis, how-
ever, the major goal to be attained is an awareness of the pressing
need for examination and reappraisal of theories and concepts in an
increasingly complex but correspondingly important field of the law.
280 "A life or disability policy may pass by transfer, will or succession
to any person, whether or not the transferee has an insurable interest.
Such transferee may recover upon it whatever the insured might have re-
covered." CAL. INS. CODE § 10130. The final sentence of this section is hardly
descriptive of the nature and extent of the interest taken by any and all
transferees.
281 E.g., Jackson v. Fisher, 56 Cal. 2d 196, 363 P.2d 479, 14 Cal. Rptr. 439
(1961), in which it was held that the California exemption statute protected a
beneficiary though he was not a dependent, but a creditor, under a policy
taken out to secure a debt. 14 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1962).
282 See, e.g., Succession of Videau, 197 So. 2d 655 (La. Ct. of Appeal
1967). See also 42 TUL. L. REV. 425 (1968) where the confusion created by use
of the term "proceeds and avails" in the Louisiana exemption statute with
reference to its application to cash surrender value is examined.
1218 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 20
